Yerushalmi Gittin 8:1 ירושלמי גיטין ח׳:א׳

MISHNAH: If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife while she is in her own house or her own courtyard, she is divorced¹The verse Deut. 24:1 requires the bill of divorce to be delivered “into her hand”. Legally, “hand” means “possession” (as in Latin and many other languages). Since anything lying in somebody’s real estate is in his possession, delivery of the bill into the wife’s real estate is legal delivery.. If he threw it to her inside his house or his courtyard, even if he was together with her in a bed, she is not divorced²If the wife is in his real estate, only delivery into her hand or her personal belongings (the folds of her garment or her wool basket) is legal delivery.. Into her bosom or her wool basket³Greek κάλαθος “wicker-basket”, e. g., basket for wool., she is divorced²If the wife is in his real estate, only delivery into her hand or her personal belongings (the folds of her garment or her wool basket) is legal delivery..

HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.”⁴A shortened version of this argument is in the Babli, 77b. The argument follows R. Aqiba, who derives rules from every word which could be considered not absolutely necessary. Since “he shall deliver” is mentioned both in Deut. 24:1 and 24:3, he concludes that any legal delivery is acceptable. Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael⁵R. Ismael holds that “the Torah speaks in everybody’s language.” Therefore, if “hand” is to be interpreted as “possession”, a verse has to be found in which this sense is documented. This is Num. 21:26 which notes that Siḥon the Amorite “took all the land from the Moabite king’s hand”. Since land cannot be grasped in one’s hand, “hand” must mean “possession”. (A hint of this argument is in Sifry Deut. 269. The Babli, Baba Meṣi‘a 56b, following only R. Aqiba, accepts the interpretation of “hand” as “possession” only in extraordinary cases.), “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.

But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct⁶In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the wife’s dowry, brought into the marriage, becomes the husband’s property as mortmain subject to his obligation to restitute the full value at the termination of the marriage. Property coming to the wife during the marriage is paraphernalia property about which the husband assumes the duty of administration and from which he has the usufruct. In any case, it is impossible to say that (in the absence of a contract of separation of properties) the wife’s properties were in her actual possession during her marriage. Cf. Yebamot 7:1, Note 1.? Rebbi Joshua⁷No R. Joshua is known among Amoraïm. One has to read with Tosaphot (s.v. מה, 77b): R. Joḥanan. in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties⁸Cf. Mishnah Ketubot 9:1 (Notes 1–4) about the different formulations of separation of properties..” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.⁹In the words of the Babli, 77a: In a divorce, her bill of divorce and her entering into full possession of her properties are simultaneous. Even if the husband had the administration of the properties when he dispatched the bill of divorce, the moment the latter landed on his wife’s property he has lost the administration, and all property rights revert to his ex-wife.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr¹⁰In the Babli (Qiddušin 23b), the attributions are switched: R. Meїr holds that neither slave nor wife have powers of acquisition separate from husband or master, and the rabbis disagree.. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand¹¹While anything the slave acquires automatically becomes his master’s property, the master by delivering the bill of manumission empowers the slave to own property, in particular, himself.. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand¹²This is a rhetorical question; the answer was already given, cf. Note 11.? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband¹³The husband possibly is the administrator but not the owner., even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write¹⁴The right to joint property can be renounced only by transfer of property rights, not by a disclaimer.. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote¹⁵If the husband never had any rights of administration, he does not have to disclaim them. It is a recognized way of giving property to one’s daughter to shield it from the son-in-law; Mishnah Nedarim 11:8 (Notes 69,70)..

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he threw it to her in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them, what is the rule¹⁶If the bill of divorce is deposited in a private domain which belongs neither to the husband nor to the wife, can the wife legally acquire the document by lifting it up or drawing it close to her so that it could be lifted up. In the public domain this is possible as explained in Mishnah 2.? Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That is a problem for the rabbis. ¹⁷This is also referred to in Qiddušin 1:4 (60b 1. 32). The text of the following Tosephta (attributed to the Elder R. Ḥiyya) is slightly garbled here; it is translated following the text of Qiddušin (and its parallels in Babli Baba batra 85a, Tosephta Baba batra5:2). Rebbi Abin said, it is a disagreement between Rav and the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya, for Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: Drawing close does not acquire in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them¹⁸Mishnah Qiddušin 1:4 states that “movables can only be acquired by being moved” (unless they are acquired together with real estate.) It is a peculiarity of rabbinic law (for which no biblical tradition is claimed) that transfer of money does not transfer ownership of the commodity bought. Delivery is effected and responsibility for the merchandise is transferred from the seller to the buyer uniquely by an act of acquisition by the buyer, which in theory should be actual moving of the merchandise.. But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in disagreement: “Under which circumstances did they say that movables are acquired by drawing close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which belongs to neither of them. But in the buyer’s domain he acquired the moment he accepted it¹⁹Since “a person’s courtyard acquires for him” (cf. Note 1.). In the seller’s domain he does not acquire unless either he lifts it up or moves it out of its prior owner’s domain. In a domain where it was deposited²⁰The merchandise was deposited with a third person. Then the owner of the property may grant the buyer the right (with or without payment) to use his property for the acquisition. Without an explicit grant, the merchandise can be acquired only by actual removal from the premises. he does not acquire unless he either is explicitly empowered or he leases its place.²¹For Rav, a divorce document can be delivered on another person’s property only by direct delivery. For R. Ḥiyya, the delivery can be indirect as long as no party has an interest in the property. The Babli, Baba batra85a, recognizes only R. Ḥiyya’s position.”

Ulla bar Ismael said, he never thought to have a right to her wool basket²²He explains why the wife is divorced if the husband throws the bill of divorce into her wool basket in his house. According to the Tosephta quoted in the preceding paragraph, the wife should not be able to acquire anything on the husband’s premises without bodily removing it from the premises. It is now stated that this excludes the wife’s personal things.. Think of it, if her wool basket was of gold? Certainly he never thought to have a right to her wool basket. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if it is being used²³If she is using the wool basket at the moment, it is part of her outfit. If the husband puts the bill of divorce into one of her bags which is not being used, it is no delivery.. Rebbi Yose said, only if she is using it at that moment²⁴R. Yose only makes R. Joḥanan’s statement clear.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if it is tied to her; Rebbi Yose said, if she lifts it for her purpose²⁵Similar statements of the parties involved are in the Babli, 78a.. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if he threw it into her maloš²⁶This hapax is unexplained; the hypothetical meaning “baking trough” from לוש is adopted by the classical commentaries. {Perhaps explain as Greek μαλλός, ὁ “flock of wool, tress”, as contents of her κάλαθος (Note 3) (E. G.). In Galilean speech, no difference existed between שׁ, שׂ and ס.} she is divorced.