Yerushalmi Kiddushin 2:1 ירושלמי קידושין ב׳:א׳

MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent¹Since the groom is not permitted to live with the bride before the definitive marriage, the preliminary marriage is a legal, not a personal, act and may be executed either by the principal or by his duly appointed representative. For the same reason, a woman may appoint a representative to agree on her behalf to the stipulations proposed by the groom., and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter²Who still can be married off by her father without necessarily being asked, while she is able to act in law in other respects; cf. Chapter 1, Note 228, Yebamot 1:2, Note 159. in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married³Two separate gifts of less than a peruṭah each do not add up to one gift of a peruṭah.. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah⁴If the entire gift was given, or at least promised, as a whole, it does not matter of how many individual pieces it is composed., but if she was eating immediately⁵If the dates were not promised as a bunch but given as “this and this and this” and the first date was already eaten by the time the second was received, they cannot be counted together since a nonexisting object cannot be counted together with an existing one. But if ten dates were promised at the outset in so many words and the prospective bride ate each one as soon as she received it, she is preliminarily married as soon as together they had represented a peruṭah’ s worth. what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.

HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead⁶Since preliminary marriage is an act prescribed by biblical standards, one has to ascertain that agency is admissible in the fulfilment of biblical decrees. {Agency always is direct representation as in Egyptian and Roman law (cf. R. Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri, New York 1944, §37). Indirect representation is authorized only if it unquestionably is to the benefit of the person represented; cf. Giṭṭin 1:6, Notel74.}? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.⁷Ex. 12:6.” But do all of them slaughter⁸Since the Passover sacrifice is not an individual but a family affair, it is obvious that only one person can slaughter for his entire family.? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead⁹Mekhilta Bo,Masekhet Depisḥa Chap. 5 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, p. 17) as tannaïtic statement; in the Babli attributed to R. Joshua ben Qorḥa. The parallel discussion in the Babli, 41a–42a, is a long-winded, possibly Saboraic, affair.. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house¹⁰Ex. 12:3. The same argument applies as for the other verse. Then the question arises, at least for the school of R. Aqiba, why the same rule has to be expressed by two separate verses. This contradicts R. Aqiba’s axiom that the Torah text admits of no redundancies..” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many¹¹In Mekhilta Bo,Masekhet Depisḥa Chap. 3 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, p. 11) this also is a tannaïtic statement, not the subject of a discussion.? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge¹²The people participating in the Passover meal do not have to know who prepared it. Therefore, the slaughterer does not have to be the agent of every participant; the verse Ex. 12:6 does not prove the thesis for which it was quoted.. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge¹³Pesaḥim 8:1 (35d 1. 13), Babli Nedarim 36a. A person who was not inscribed beforehand in the list of participants cannot join the Passover celebration; Mishnah Zebaḥim 5:8. Only Ex. 12:3 is a proof; there is no redundancy..

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness¹⁴In the Babli, 43a, the Tannaïtic tradition is declared to be unclear. The problem is that if an agent acts instead of the principal, he should be disqualified from acting as a witness if the principal is unable to testify. Since relatives are disqualified as witnesses and everybody is a relative of himself, an agent should be disqualified in any suit involving the principal’s money.. How is that? If he sent two¹⁵In the quote of this baraita in the Babli, 43a, “three”. Qorban Ha‘edah reads the statement as “two [in addition to the agent]”., in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses¹⁶Only one of the three may be appointed as agent to reserve the option of proving a case in court by witnesses.. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses¹⁷At the same time agents and witnesses.. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony¹⁸If he did not deliver the money to the prospective bride, he would have to pay back the consignor; his testimony is self-serving and therefore barred.. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy¹⁹All commentators have great difficulty with this statement, from Tosaphot (43b s. v. וכן) and Rashba (Novellae, 43a s. v. ירושלמי) to the commentators of Maimonides (ad Iššut3:16) and the standard commentators of the Yerushalmi (שיירי קרבן and מראה פנים ad loc.). In fact, R. Yose’s remark is incompatible with the Babli’s treatment of the subject in 43a/b. R. Yose seems to argue that the monetary aspect is irrelevant. The main consequence of preliminary marriage is to forbid the woman to any man other than her fiancé; this is not a matter of civil law. It is a principle in both Talmudim that in matters of prohibitions a single witness has standing by biblical law (cf. Soṭah 6:2, Note 26). Since the agent has standing in biblical law to force her to go to court if she wants to marry any other man, he also has standing to join another witness in the related financial case., even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness²⁰Since the normal case is preliminary marriage by money, it must be assumed that the case before Rav was of this kind. Since Rav was the foremost authority in Babylonia, his decision was obligatory precedent in Babylonia.. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged²¹He said that all amphoras in his corral were his own property. This is a purely financial case, where R. Yose’s argument is irrelevant.. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter²²The person hired to deliver the amphoras to the corral was admitted as witness in court, even though his testimony was partly self-serving since he would have been liable as a thief had he failed to deliver the amphoras.
Since R. Jeremiah had a low opinion of everything Babylonian, it follows that the rule admitting an agent as witness is accepted both in Babylonia and in Galilee..

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead²³Everybody agrees that there exist situations in which an agent acts with the full authority of a principal and others where only the person himself can act. The question is, what is the normal case and what is the exception?. “If he definitively will substitute²⁴This seems to be a quote from Lev. 27:10, but there the masoretic text is הָמֵר יָמִיר. If the word יְמִירֶנּוּ is not a slip of the scribe’s pen, the reference might be to יַחֲליפֶנּוּ (“he himself may exchange it”) in the same verse. There is no explicit baraita in rabbinic literature which would invalidate substitution by agent; the double expression is always interpreted as an addition in R. Aqiba’s system. In Sifra Beḥuqqotay Pereq 9(6), the double expression is interpreted to include a woman for her own sacrifice and an heir for an inherited one. Since the agent is not mentioned, he is excluded. In the Babli, Temurah 2a, the statement of Sifra is characterized as R. Meïr’s., if he himself will dissolve²⁵Num. 30:14. This does not refer to an infinitive construction but to the use of the word יְפֵרֶנּוּ instead of the simple יָפֵר. In R. Aqiba’s system, suffixes always carry a special meaning. The argument is explicit in the Babli, Nazir 12b, where the Tanna R. Joshia quotes Num. 30:14 to prove that a husband cannot delegate his power over his wife’s vows to an attorney. R. Jonathan holds that an agent always can act for his principal..” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,²⁶Lev. 1:4;3:2,8,13;4:24,29,33, a necessary action to validate a sacrifice. The repetition of his hand in all these verses is taken in the Babli, Menaḥot93b, as proof that any agency is impossible for animal sacrifices.” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent²⁷This formulation is in Sifra Wayyiqra Pereq 4(2).. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl²⁸Ex. 21:6, speaking of the Hebrew slave; cf. Chapter 1:2.;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent²⁹Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 253), dR.Simeon ben Ioḥai Mišpaṭim 6:6.. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority³⁰This opinion is not found in any parallel source..

³¹From Giṭṭin 6:2, Notes 55–69. Variant readings are given there. We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi³²The Babylonian, Rav Assi in the Babli.: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs³³This statement seems to be a contradiction in terms. The definition of an underage girl is a female who does not yet have two pubic hairs. The interpretation can be either that she contracted the marriage when she was underage but now, when the case comes to court, she already became an adolescent (R. Moses Margalit) or, preferably, that she is an adolescent (Chapter 1, Note 228) who, while legally responsible, still is under her father’s authority in marital matters (R. David Fraenckel). In either case it is presumed that the father was not informed of the preliminary marriage at the time it was contracted.
In the Babli, 46a, Rav Assi’s statement is that only the father has the right to annul her marriage but not she herself, since she unlawfully arrogated to herself the rights of an adult. In the Babli, practice is decided following Rav that both her father and herself have the right to unilaterally terminate the irregular preliminary marriage., her father repudiates the marriage³⁴Repudiation of a marriage is possible only for an orphan girl who was married off by her mother or brothers, who can walk out of a marriage by a simple declaration as long as she is formally underage, i. e., did not grow two pubic hairs (Yebamot Chapter 13). In the present case, the expression “repudiates” would seem to be inappropriate but it is justified in the Babli (46a) by reference to Ex. 22:16 which uses the verb מאן to describe the father’s veto of the marriage of his daughter to her seducer. but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation³⁵Since only the father has the right to contract the marriage of his underage or adolescent daughter, there is no marriage and the transaction does not have to be nullified.. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards³⁶Since he holds that there is an opinion which gives the adolescent girl the right to marry on her own, he would have to require a valid bill of divorce to dissolve the marriage.. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf³⁷R. Joḥanan agrees that the marriage contracted by an adolescent on her own is valid if it is not countermanded by her father. She herself cannot walk out of a union contracted by herself as an adolescent. Since this statement cannot hold for a marriage contracted by an underage girl without her father’s knowledge, it seems that the interpretation of R. Moses Margalit cannot be sustained..

Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she³⁸An underage or adolescent girl. was preliminarily married with agreement³⁹The father’s agreement. but definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and removed her from the bridal chamber⁴⁰Even an adolescent is emancipated from her father’s power only by definitive marriage, not by the preliminary. Therefore, she cannot contract the definitive marriage on her own.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua⁴¹This name probably is corrupt.: He⁴²R. Abba bar Cahana justified himself for quoting R. Joshua ben Levi whom he could not have known by quoting an attached lemma to the effect that the latter ruled differently from what R. Simeon ben Laqish would expound a generation later. had an indication that Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagreed with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But this does not disagree. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said there⁴³Two paragraphs earlier., she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings, so Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said here, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings⁴⁴Her earnings are her father’s before and her husband’s after definitive marriage. Therefore, it is understandable that the father will want to give his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage, for which he is paid, but refuse to let her enter definitive marriage before she reaches adulthood and he anyhow loses the right to her earnings.. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi came in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married without agreement and was being definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and annulled her preliminary marriage⁴⁵Then automatically the definitive marriage cannot proceed..

If she³⁸An underage or adolescent girl. was preliminarily married with agreement³⁹The father’s agreement. but definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave⁴⁶If the bride was an Israel but the groom a Cohen. The wife of a Cohen is a member of his family and as such entitled to eat heave (Num. 18:11).? Rav said, she does eat; but Samuel said, she may not eat. Rebbi Mana said, Rav’s reason is that if she was preliminarily married with agreement, the permanence of the status quo implies the assumption that he definitively married her with agreement⁴⁷The father’s agreement to the preliminary marriage implies his acquiescence in a definitive marriage unless he explicitly objects. A definitive marriage without consent or objection by the father is marriage with consent. The treatment of this topic in the Babli, 45b, is not comparable to the argument here since the Babli distinguishes between a marriage in the presence of the father and one contracted when the father was on a far away trip. The Babli notes that Rav in a real case followed Samuel’s opinion, attributed in the Babli to Rav Assi.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav’s reason is that by the earlier Mishnah⁴⁸Only the preliminary marriage is an act of acquisition which brings the bride into the husband’s family; cf. Ketubot 5:3, Note 66. The denial of heave to the bride before the definitive marriage is a later rabbinic institution; Mishnah Ketubot 5:4., a preliminarily married daughter of an Israel may eat heave⁴⁹By biblical standards, definitive marriage is irrelevant for the bride to be able to eat heave.. What is the difference between them? Her earnings. According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her earnings belong to her husband⁵⁰Since the earnings are the husband’s from the moment of definitive marriage which for R. Mana is valid unless vetoed explicitly.; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her earnings belong to her father⁵¹One would have to say that the father might have the right to the earnings, since R. Yose ben R. Abun does not say that the definitive marriage is invalid, only that its status is irrelevant.. If she should die, who inherits from her? According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her husband inherits; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her father inherits if she dies⁵²For the wife’s estate, the same rules apply as for the wife’s earnings.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated, for Rav her husband inherits if she dies⁵³The prior speculation about the difference between the two arguments attributed to Rav is false; R. Yose ben R. Abun also will agree that the definitive marriage is valid unless explicitly vetoed by the father. He only stated that the problem of validity of the definitive marriage is irrelevant for the problem of heave.. If she was preliminarily married without agreement and definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Samuel said, she does eat⁵⁴In the Babli, 45b, this is attributed to Rav Huna.. Come and see: If she was preliminarily married with agreement and definitively married without agreement, Samuel says that she may not eat; here he says she may eat? Samuel treats her as an orphan⁵⁵Since everything was done without consulting the father, one may assume that the latter would have indicated his disapproval had he disapproved. His silence therefore is considered as formal approval and the underage girl is emancipated from him; she becomes “an orphan during the father’s lifetime” (cf. Giṭṭin 6:1, Note 20). The same argument is given in the Babli..

Mishnah: “Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit,” etc. The Mishnah [presents the case] that she said, I cannot accept this one, try that one; I cannot accept this one, try that one⁵⁶In this interpretation, if the man said: Be preliminarily married to me by this, by that one, etc., she would be married if all dates together were worth a peruṭah. If the preliminary marriage must be mentioned every time, it must be that the proposal was rejected in between. Then not any date but specifically the last one must be worth a peruṭah.. “By this and by that one and by that one.⁵⁷The triple mention is the version of the Mishnah in the Babli and most independent Mishnah mss.” Who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. But for Rebbi Meïr, either this or this or that one⁵⁸The positions of Rebbis Jehudah and Meïr about the interpretation of conjunctions in multiple statements are discussed in Giṭṭin 9:7, Notes 93–101..

Rebbi Jeremiah⁶⁰Rav Jeremiah, the colleague of Rav. in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar⁶¹Whose opinion will be discussed later in this paragraph. will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan⁶²If the creditor forgives a loan to his prospective bride, she receives real value. Nevertheless, RR. Meïr and Simeon ben Eleazar hold that there is no marriage if nothing of the original loan is left in the fiancée’s hand. But if the money was given specifically for preliminary marriage, there is no restriction on its use. The Babli agrees, 59a, in the names of both Rav and Samuel. The Babli raises the additional problem, whether the woman may have second thoughts and return the money’s worth before the end of the thirty days if at the start she accepted it.? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage⁶³Forgiving the loan, while it might involve considerable value, is only invalidating a sheet of paper which in itself is not worth a peruṭah., while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married⁶⁴If all dates were given for the preliminary marriage and all were eaten, in what is this different from the tetradrachma which was spent before the marriage entered into force?! He explains that as earlier⁶⁵In the preceding paragraph; the woman explicitly rejected every gift as inadequate.. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”⁶⁶Even if the dates were referred to as given together.? Rebbi Eleazar said, it⁶⁷The Mishnah, while formulated anonymously, only represents the opinion of R. Simeon ben Eleazar. follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated⁶⁸Halakhah 1:1, Notes 246–249.: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr⁶⁹In asserting that Mishnah 2:1 follows R. Simeon ben Eleazar in Tosephta 3:1, R. Eleazar holds that both can be analyzed in the same way.. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber⁷⁰Baba meṣi‘a 6:3 (11a 1. 13), Babli 78a/b. If raw wool was given to the dyer to be died red and he died it black, for R. Meïr the dyer acquired the wool as a robber and has to pay the value of the raw wool to his client. R. Jehudah holds that the wool remains the property of the consignor but the dyer is paid only an amount which protects the consignor from loss. (Mishnah Baba qama 9:6), so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it⁷¹The Tosephta quoted from 1:2. to be for a loan when the lender said⁷²It would be natural to read the text as לוֹוֶה “the borrower”. This is the reading of the commentaries who are led to extraordinary intellectual acrobatics to make sense of the text. If לווה is read as a verbal noun derived from pi‘el, parallel to Babylonian מַלְוֶה, everything becomes simple., buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him⁷³R. Simeon ben Eleazar follows R. Meïr only in a very special case. He will agree in general with the anonymous majority that forgiving a loan represents enough monetary value to create a valid marriage. He only holds that if the borrower violated the terms of the loan, there no longer exists a loan but rather lender’s money in the borrower’s hand, i. e., a deposit.. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah⁷⁴This question is asked against R. Meïr’s position in general. It is understandable that for the anonymous majority the woman is married, since the profit she gains from not having to repay the entire loan is certainly worth an extra peruṭah. Therefore, even if we note that a loan was given to be spent and cannot retroactively be given as a marriage present, the additional profit for the woman makes her marriage worthwhile. But for R. Meïr, who holds that only the unspent part of the loan can be a marriage gift, there is no additional profit for the woman and one may ask why R. Meïr does not have a general statement that forgiving a loan can never be a valid marriage present.? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand⁷⁵He refers to the situation described by R. Eleazar, that the loan given to the woman turned into robbed property in her hand. If the prospective groom has documents to prove his case in court, the woman is a robber and he has a good chance to recoup his property in court, he offers her real value and the marriage is valid. But if all he has is a moral claim, that has no monetary value and cannot be used as a marriage present.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover⁷⁶This opinion does not disagree with R. Mana’s but refers to a different situation: The man is a robber and offers his prospective bride an object which he obtained by robbery. He can use the object for a preliminary marriage if and only if it is his both in ownership and in possession. The robber, who is in possession by the act of robbing, becomes owner at the moment the prior owners give up hope of recovery (cf. Giṭṭin 4:4 Note 88, 5:6 Note 169)..

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The baraita⁷¹The Tosephta quoted from 1:2. if he said to her, by the deposit you are holding for me. But if he said, by everything which I deposited with you, she is not preliminarily married unless all of it is available⁷⁷Since he insists that everything shall be her property, she cannot be married if anything does not become her property because it is lost.. What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was given to be spent⁷⁸Babli 47a; Mo‘ed qaṭan 2:3 (81b 1. 27).; this was not given to be spent⁷⁹It is at the disposal of the depositor at any moment.. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.” Then even if a peruṭah’ s worth was left, she should not be preliminarily married unless all of them were available! He explains that as earlier⁶⁵In the preceding paragraph; the woman explicitly rejected every gift as inadequate.. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”^66,Even if the dates were referred to as given together.⁸⁰If the dates were stated as given together, the marriage should be possible if all of them come into the woman's hand together.? Rebbi Abun said, were we not of the opinion to say, who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah⁵⁸The positions of Rebbis Jehudah and Meïr about the interpretation of conjunctions in multiple statements are discussed in Giṭṭin 9:7, Notes 93–101.. Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Jehudah imply comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices⁸¹Cf. Giṭṭin 9:7. If A sues B for wheat, barley, and spelt, and B denies falsely in court that he owes any, he has to atone by one sacrifice. But if he enters three separate denials, he owes three separate sacrifices.. Just as he says there, comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices, so he says here, comprehensive one preliminary marriage, in detail three preliminary marriages⁸²As explained earlier, the Mishnah is explained to refer to the case that the woman rejects all dates except the last. Then each is given as a separate gift; one cannot require that all of them should have been together..

“Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma,” and she said, “throw it into the sea or the river,” she is not married.⁸⁶A superficially similar text is in the Babli, 8b, and Tosephta, 2:8. The big difference is that in the Babylonian texts the woman took the coin and threw it into the sea whereas in the Yerushalmi the woman never touched the coin. It is a recognized principle that actions speak louder than words; if a marriage gift is offered to a woman and she reacts by throwing it away, she certainly is not married. This has nothing to do with the problem treated in the present paragraph. “Give it to a poor person,” she is married⁸⁷From the moment the coin was given as charity.. In either case nothing came into her hand; in one case you say, she is married; in the other case you say, she is not married! Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She wants to be married and be seen as benefiting the poor. Rebbi Phineas said, this can be interpreted either following Rebbi Ze‘ira or Rebbi Ila.

⁸³This text is from Demay 6:12, Notes 205–214 (ד). This insert given in the next paragraph shows that this is a genuine quote, not a copy. As it was stated: “One may say to his worker: Here you have a denar, use it for food, here you have a denar, use it for drink, and not be worried about either the Sabbatical year, tithes, or wine for libations. But if he told him, go and buy yourself a loaf and I shall give you the money, go and buy yourself a reviït of wine and I shall give you the money, he has to worry because of the Sabbatical year, tithes, and wine used for libations.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the grocer becomes the agent of the employer to let the worker acquire. ⁸⁵Text missing here, added from Demay.[Rebbi Hila said, the worker] acquired for the employer from the grocer and then acquires it himself.

Here also, in the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira the husband becomes the wife’s agent⁸⁸Therefore, the coin became the woman’s property in her future husband’s hand; the objection raised at the start is baseless. to benefit the poor. Rebbi Hila said, the poor person acquired it for the wife from her husband⁸⁷From the moment the coin was given as charity. and afterwards acquired it for himself.

⁸⁴This also is from Demay. What is the difference between them? If the grocer was deaf-mute. According to Rebbi Ze‘ira, he does not have to worry because a deaf-mute cannot become an agent; according to Rebbi Hila, he does have to worry.

If the worker was deaf-mute. According to Rebbi Hila, he does not have to worry⁸⁹But then the woman is not married if the coin is given to a deaf-mute beggar. because a deaf-mute cannot acquire; according to Rebbi Ze‘ira, he does have to worry.

If he grabbed a tetradrachma from her hands, returned it to her, and at the moment of delivery said to her: “You are preliminarily married to me”, then she is preliminarily married. By what was she preliminarily married⁹⁰Since it was her money, she did not receive anything. In addition, it is questionable whether one may use robbed property as marriage gift.? Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Pedat: She wants to be preliminarily married⁹¹In the Babli, 13a, she is only married if she had previously agreed to be married to him. to him and he would owe her a tetradrachma⁹²She accepts the coin as a marriage gift, not as return of stolen goods. Therefore, the husband now owes her another tetradrachma.. Rebbi Yose said, if this had been formulated for a vessel, it would be understandable. A tetradrachma can be exchanged⁹³Nobody insists that payment be made with a particular coin. He disputes that the husband owes another coin. The fact that she does not have to go to court to retrieve her coin is worth a peruṭah..

⁹⁴Tosephta 2:7–9; Babli 12b, 13a, 8a.“ ‘Hold this tetradrachma for me’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is preliminarily married⁹⁵Unless she objects in word or deed. She is married if she remains silent.. After delivery, if she agrees⁹⁶But not if she remains silent., she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. ‘Here is the tetradrachma which I owe you,’ and at the moment of delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ if she agrees⁹⁶But not if she remains silent., she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. If after delivery he said, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me,’ she is not preliminarily married even if both parties agree. What can he do? He should take the coin back, deliver it again and say, ‘lo, you are preliminarily married to me.’ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this mina,’ if it turns out that a denar was missing, she is not preliminarily married⁹⁷Since there is no mina given to her.. If one denar was bad⁹⁸Counterfeit or underweight., she is preliminarily married if he replaces it. If he was counting the coins into her hand, she can change her mind any time before he finishes.” Rebbi Eleazar said, she is preliminarily married by the first [coin]; the remainder is a condition⁹⁹Babli 8a, 47a. It is understood that he asked the woman to be married by a mina, not this mina. Then the first coin establishes the marriage, the remainder is the husband’s debt to be liquidated.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only after he completes [the count.]¹⁰⁰He seems to hold that the start of delivery is an obligation to finish it at that time. This opinion is not mentioned in the Babli since it is retracted here. It was said that Rebbi Joḥanan changed his mind about this.

¹⁰¹A different version is in Baba meṣi‘a 4:2 (9c). A person gave a pledge to another; the other reneged on it¹⁰²In Baba meṣi‘a: A person made a down payment, the seller then annulled the contract. Here also “reneged” does not mean that the seller claimed not to have received a pledge, but that he refused to honor the contract.. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Hila, and Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa all three say it was a deal about flax seed¹⁰³In Baba meṣi‘a: “silk”. and he had given partial payment. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan¹⁰⁴In Baba meṣi‘a: Before R. Ḥiyya bar Joseph and R. Joḥanan. This also is required by the context here., who said: Either he delivers the entire contract or one may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.¹⁰⁵It was stated in Mishnah 1:5 that possession of movables is obtained only by an act of moving. The buyer does not acquire possession by paying the price for the object bought. It is possible for the seller to take the money but then to renege on the deal, not deliver the merchandise but return the money. The injured buyer cannot force the execution of the contract but Mishnah Baba meṣi‘a 4:2 states that he can go to court and have the court declare that “He Who exacted retribution from the generation of the Flood and of the generation of the Tower of Babylon will in the future exact retribution from him who does not keep his word.”” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, either he delivers for the amount of the pledge or ome may turn him over to “Him Who exacted retribution.¹⁰⁶R. Joḥanan here decides following R. Eleazar in the previous paragraph: Even a partial payment validates the entire deal. He should hold that the woman who starts to accept partial payment for the promised marriage gift is married. R. Ḥiyya bar Joseph represents the position first ascribed to R. Joḥanan, that financial deals are not completed until the entire debt be paid.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph agrees with Rebbi Joḥanan in a sale which is not usually split, such as of a cow or a stole¹⁰⁷A down payment for a cow requires the delivery of the entire cow.. Is a woman usually acquired split? Rebbi Ḥaggai and Rebbi Yudan both said, a sale usually may be split, the acquisition of a wife cannot be split¹⁰⁸The position of R. Eleazar in the preceding paragraph is universally accepted..