Yerushalmi Yevamot 10:2 ירושלמי יבמות י׳:ב׳

MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband⁶⁸The Tannaïm mentioned in this Mishnah all disagree with Mishnah 1 in some respects. R. Yose must hold that the first husband also must provide for her until she is divorced.. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows⁶⁹He agrees with R. Yose that she is entitled to ketubah from the first husband; therefore, the husband is entitled to receive her earnings.. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation⁷⁰If the first husband dies childless in the case she was permitted to return to him, the levir may take her in regular levirate. with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him⁷¹The first husband. The child from him after his return even if he is not allowed to take her back is never a bastard. is not a bastard; if she was married without permission⁷²She remarried on the basis of the information by two witnesses that her husband had died without asking the court for a declaration that the husband was dead. Then her second marriage was in error and is non-existent; her adultery was unintentional and does not bar her from returning to an Israel husband. But if the second marriage was contracted under the supervision of the court, it cannot be considered non-existent and she cannot return to her first husband parallel to the remarried divorcee. In any case, any sexual relation she may have with the first husband after the dissolution of the second marriage cannot be incestuous (cf. Notes 64,128). she is permitted to return to him.
If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice⁷³A purification sacrifice is available only to persons acting carelessly (Lev. 4:2). Her transgression is neither intentional (for which no sacrifice would atone, Num. 15:30–31) nor careless; no guilt is attached to her in the eyes of the earthly or the Heavenly court.; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice⁷⁴Not asking the court to investigate the disappearance of her husband is carelessness.. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved⁷⁵By having unmarried sex; in the opinion of the Babli also by entering a forbidden marriage, e. g., a divorcee marrying a Cohen. The Yerushalmi accepts and the Babli rejects the entire Mishnah., she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.

HALAKHAH: “If she married by a decision of the court,” etc. ⁷⁶The origin of this paragraph is in Halakhah 8, about other Mishnaiot. Rebbi Abba: Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter⁷⁷Mishnah 3 is a continuation of Mishnah 1, not Mishnah 2.. What does Rebbi Yose say about the other matters? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Yose said, anything which disables for others disables for himself; anything which does not disable for others does not disable for himself⁷⁸Mishnah 10; Tosephta 11:7. Since the second husband by his intercourse disables the wife for her first husband, he disables her for himself and she must be divorced by both of them as is stated in Mishnah 1. But if a woman went overseas and her husband married her single sister on the erroneous news of his wife’s death, since he does not disable the sister for anybody by his invalid marriage he does not disable himself to return to his wife..” And Rebbi Abba said, Rav Hamnuna and Rebbi Ze‘ira both say that this refers to the beginning of the chapter. This means that Rebbi Yose does not disagree about the other matters⁷⁹The only disagreement of R. Yose with the Tanna of Mishnah 1 is that he holds that the wife can collect her ketubah from her first husband..

What does Rebbi Eleazar say about ketubah? If you say that he is entitled to things that come to him in prohibition, then ketubah that came to him in permission certainly⁸⁰If the first husband has the right to his wife’s earnings as long as he did not divorce her, then certainly he is obligated to pay the ketubah whose obligation he accepted voluntarily when she was permitted to him.!

It is reasonable to say that Rebbi Eleazar agrees with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose does not agree with Rebbi Eleazar⁸¹In the Babli, 91a, this is the opinion of Rav Huna and is disputed by R. Joḥanan. In Rav Huna’s interpretation, for R. Eleazar the first husband can get his wife’s earnings only on the basis of the marital contract which is the ketubah; R. Yose will hold that the husband gets nothing to induce him to grant a speedy divorce.; Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar agree with Rebbi Simeon but Rebbi Simeon does not agree with Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Eleazar⁸²In the Babli, 91a, this is the opinion of R. Joḥanan and is disputed by Rav Huna. It seems that here only the first statement of R. Simeon is considered (as shown by the next sentence), that if the first husband dies childless before he could divorce his wife, the action of a brother in levirate or ḥalîṣah with her is invalid as marriage act but effective to free the co-wives. The reason given in the Babli is that R. Simeon holds that no rabbinic decree exists in this case after the death of the first husband.
The Babli holds that the composition principle in this Mishnah is that direction of agreement is always the same, either the later agree with the former (Rav Huna) or the former agree with the later (R. Joḥanan). This explains the slight deviation in the Mishnah from the chronological principle (R. Simeon is slightly older than R. Eleazar ben Shamua). The Yerushalmi rejects such schematism.. This means that in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, invalid intercourse frees⁸³Cf. Chapter 5, Notes 96, 98..

⁸⁴Here starts the discussion of Mishnah 3. Would it not be reasonable that she should be permitted if she remarried with permission, forbidden if she remarried without permission? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Simeon [imply] that the court made their decision like intentional [relations between] man and woman⁸⁵Intentional adultery., if she remarried without permission⁸⁶The only case in which she could remarry without permission of the court is that two witnesses testified to the first husband’s death. Since two concurrent witnesses must be believed by biblical standards, her remarriage was an excusable error which can be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. like erroneous [relations between] man and woman. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no “free” here but “obligated”⁸⁷He holds that the woman acted in good faith in both cases and that, therefore, her adultery was unintentional in both cases and can be expiated by a purification sacrifice. This is the position of Ze‘iri in the Babli, 92a.. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: should it not be an act of instruction? When they instructed that it is permitted to sleep with an [otherwise] married woman⁸⁸Everybody knows that adultery is biblically prohibited and that it is not in the power of the court to permit it.. Is that not uprooting a principle⁸⁹It is agreed that if the supreme court instructs that a biblical commandment is invalidated, no individual has the right to follow that instruction; Horaiot 1:3 (fol. 46a), Babli 4a.? When they instructed that she is forbidden for five years, from then on permitted⁹⁰To declare the husband as dead after five years is within the competence of the court. If the wife remarried after five years, she was behaving correctly.. Then it should be so if she misbehaved! Misbehaving is like eating fat or blood. When they instructed that fat is permitted and [she ate] blood⁹¹“Any fat or blood” is forbidden to eat (Lev. 3:17). However, it is clear from the context that only fat is forbidden which may be burned on the altar (cf., e. g., Lev. 4:8). Therefore, a technical ruling is needed to define which fat of cattle, sheep, or goats qualifies as חלב. If the court rules that certain fat that was considered forbidden is now permitted, a lay person who follows their ruling is excused; the sin is the court’s. But if the layman uses the permission of fat to eat of the permitted fat when it still contains blood, he is guilty since the ruling never included permission to eat “unkoshered” fat. Similarly, a permission to remarry does not include permission of promiscuity whose prohibition has biblical roots that have nothing to do with adultery.
The Babli concurs, 92a..