Yerushalmi Yevamot 5:4 ירושלמי יבמות ה׳:ד׳

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited⁵¹After ḥalîṣah, no transaction is legal between the levir and the widow.
“Bespeaking” and the bill of divorce become nonexistent, and the inter course incestuous., or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah⁵²In this case, “bespeaking” and ḥalîṣah are nonexistent. He married and then divorced the sister-in-law.. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law⁵³This really is an introduction to the following Mishnaiot..

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood⁵⁴A secondḥalîṣah is invalid; it is as if it had never happened. But illicit sex always has consequences, whether in connection with levirate or not. The statement is in Tosephta 7:5.. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow⁵⁵Since ḥalîṣah rabbinically is considered an equivalent of divorce, the widow of a childless man is always forbidden to marry a Cohen unless she is married in levirate.? But she is disabled from eating heave⁵⁶If she is the childless daughter of a Cohen; cf. Chapter 4, Note 206.. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave⁵⁷The argument is predicated on the arguments in Chapter 1, Notes 80–88, where it is held that probably for R. Joḥanan sexual contact of a levir with the widowed sister-in-law is never punishable. If it is not punishable, it cannot exclude the childless widow from returning to her priestly family.? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah⁵⁸Chapter 1, Note 80.. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her⁵⁹Once she is considered a divorcee in relation to a Cohen, any sexual relation with a Cohen desecrates her; cf. Chapter 1, Note 239..

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already⁶⁰Mishnah 1. “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law⁶¹From Mishnah 1 it is not clear that after ḥalîṣah of one widow all actions with regard to the other are also as if nonexistent.”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her⁶²Since it was established in Chapter 1 that the widow is at most forbidden by a simple prohibition, not threatened by divine extirpation, it is clear that qiddushin by one of the brothers will be illegal but valid.? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law⁶³While “bespeaking” has the external form of qiddushin, their rules are quite different. After ḥalîṣah, any “bespeaking” is impossible; an action of “bespeaking” is null and void but the same action with the intent of qiddushin in valid. The same position is taken in the Babli, 52b.. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated⁶⁴A different but parallel formulation in Babli, 19b.: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention⁶⁵For them, “bespeaking” follows the rules of qiddushin as closely as possible.. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional⁶⁶Mishnah 6:1., so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce⁶⁷The divorce document for “bespeaking”, which cannot exist without the groom’s initiative, can be delivered without getting the widow’s attention. Nothing is implied for divorce of an original marriage. frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult⁶⁸But not of a minor. Since a minor can act in practice but not in law, “bespeaking”, qiddushin, and divorce are not applicable to minors. acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional⁶⁹Ḥalîṣah is enacted by both parties; it cannot happen without conscious participation of both parties..