Yerushalmi Gittin 7 ירושלמי גיטין ז׳

MISHNAH: If somebody had an attack of seizures¹The word קורדייקוס is taken as Greek κορδακικός “staggering, making drunken movements,” derived from κόρδαξ, Latin cordax, “extravagant dance in Greek comedy.” The nature of the seizures is not described in either Talmud, but it is implied that during an attack the person is not of sane mind. and said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, he did not say anything. If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are nothing. If somebody became paralyzed²He is of clear mind but has lost his power of speech., one asks him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife, and he nods his head, one checks him out three times. If he answers no for no, yes for yes³If he repeatedly shakes his head sideways when asked whether not to write the bill but nods if asked whether to write the bill, his intentions and instructions are confirmed., they shall write and deliver.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. ⁴This text is from Terumot 1:1, Notes 38–50. In the variants, ת denotes the Leiden ms. of Terumot and ר the Rome ms. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog⁵Cf. E. Guggenheimer and H. Guggenheimer, Notes on the Talmudic vocabulary,gndryps-qntrwpys, Lešonenu 35 (1971) 201–207 (Hebrew); Talmudic evidence for Greek spelling, Studi classici in onore di Quintino Cataudella, vol. iv, U. Catania (1972) 1981, 313–314.; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person]⁶From the text in Terumot, missing here., and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.

⁷From Terumot 1:1, Notes 52–55. The slightly different Terumot text is given in the second column.“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said⁸In the next paragraph., when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!⁹The verse is quoted correctly in Terumot.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity¹¹In the Babli, 70b, the attributions are switched, following the later argument in this paragraph (Note 17).. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: ¹²This quote is incomplete; the text has to be completed from Horaiot (Note 10) and a related text in the Babli, Zebaḥim 12b. The completed text must read: “If somebody had eaten forbidden fat and already had prepared his separation sacrifice when he became…” A purification sacrifice is personal; if its owner died it cannot be transferred to another owner or another use, nor can it be redeemed. The question is whether insanity makes a person lose his individuality; if the answer is positive then during the period of insanity the sacrificial animal was ownerless and cannot then or afterwards be of any use; it has to be put away until it dies a natural death. If he became deaf-mute¹³The illiterate deaf-mute has lost his legal personality; cf. Ketubot Chpater 1, Note 134, Yebamot 14:1., or insane, or became an apostate¹⁴Lev. 1:2: “If a person from among you present a sacrifice …” is interpreted to mean that the rules of obligatory sacrifices apply to converts but exclude apostates [Babli Ḥulin 5a, 13b; Erubin 69b; Sifra Wayyiqra Paršata 2(3)]., or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten¹⁵The High Court in the Temple ruled that the circumstances for which the person brings his purification offering do not imply that a sin was committed. Since a purification offering cannot be brought as a voluntary gift, the offering becomes unusable. It is stated here that if the court later reverses itself, R. Joḥanan holds that the sacrifice is not reinstated., Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside¹⁶If circumstances change, the sacrifice may be re-instated.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa]¹⁷It is obvious that the reading from Horaiot, R. Aḥa, is correct, since R. Joḥanan, who is quoted in the text here, has no influence over what future generations report in his name. R. Aḥa’s tradition is the source of the quote in the Babli (Note 11). switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel¹⁸Since both R. Samuel bar Abba and R. Simeon bar Abba were students of R. Joḥanan, it is impossible to decide between the readings here and in Horaiot. bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill¹⁹These sacrifices may not be offered for the deceased. The priest who was informed that the offering was for a terminally ill person can proceed under the assumption that the person is alive at the moment which validates the offering, when the blood of the sacrifice is sprinkled on the wall of the altar.. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa²⁰In Horaiot: R. Immi, the permanent companion of R. Yasa. It follows that the R. Ḥiyya mentioned here is R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, student and successor to R. Joḥanan., one follows the one, the other follows the other²¹It is not stated who followed R. Joḥanan and who R. Simeon ben Laqish; from the following it seems that the Yerushalmi does not accept R. Aḥa’s relabelling of the opinions..

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish²²For R. Joḥanan, the wife is divorced since the bill was delivered; for R. Simeon ben Laqish the attack of insanity invalidates the delivery. If the husband regains his sanity, he has to take back the bill from his wife and deliver it a second time.. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave²³The insane person cannot separate heave from grain; his actions are irrelevant in law (Mishnah Terumot 1:1). from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded²⁴He is slowly but surely dying. when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him²⁵A similar formulation is in the Tosephta (5:1): “If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers as long as he is alive.”. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

²⁷This and the following paragraphs are from Terumot 1:1 (ת), Notes 19–32). The Rome ms. is indicated by ר. Variants which are introduced by the hand of the corrector in Terumot are indicated by מ. It was stated: “If a deaf-mute person gave heave, it is not heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, to what does this refer? If he was born deaf-mute. But if he was normal and became deaf and dumb, he writes and others confirm his signature.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others execute his written instructions? They upheld it, if he was illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the bill] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, (here also it is invalid). Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!

Rebbi Ze‘ira²⁸Since R. Ze‘ira lived too late to have known R. Mana I and was the teacher of R. Mana II’s teacher, the correct reading is that from Terumot: R. Ezra. asked before Rebbi Mana: Just as you say that three times he must give a sign with his head, (must one equally hear his voice three times)? He said to him, hearing his voice once, giving a sign with his head three times.

Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: He should have understanding for the future if he has understanding for the past; (if he has no understanding for the past,) he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Abba Mari said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated thus: “When was this said? When he was paralyzed while being healthy. But if he was paralyzed by a prior sickness, once is enough.”

But only if it is intermittent²⁹This refers to the last part of the Mishnah, about the bill of divorce to be written for a paralyzed man. As explained here, one asks questions in which the one which counts is alternating with other questions for which the answer must be “no” (or shaking of the head).. Shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife? And he says, yes. For your mother, and he says, no. For your wife? And he says, yes. For your daughter, and he says, no. For your wife? And he says, yes. For your sister, and he says, no³⁰A paraphrase, not a parallel text, is quoted in Tosaphot 70b, s.v. בודקין.. Is it the same for testimony? Rebbi Abbahu came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is the same for testimony, since a person may testify while sitting³¹Deut. 19:17 requires only that the parties to a suit stand before the judges, not the witnesses. Therefore there is no biblical impediment to ascertaining testimony from a paralyzed person.. The same holds for vows. Rav Sheshet stated: Just as one checks three times for bills of divorce, so one checks for inheritance, commercial transactions, and gifts³²A similar text in the Babli, 71a, and Tosephta, 5:1. In both of these texts, testimony is explicitly included..

MISHNAH: If they³³An indeterminate plural always means 2. said to him³⁴As Rashi points out, he must be either a healthy person or a sick scholar, for whom the special simplified rules for the dangerously ill do not apply., shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife? If he said to them, write³⁵The husband did not appoint the people talking to him as a court since they are only two. Nor did he appoint them as witnesses to his order to the scribe, as explained in the Halakhah., and they told the scribe who wrote, and the witnesses who signed; even though they wrote, signed, and delivered it to him and he delivered it to her, this is an invalid bill of divorce unless he said to the scribe, write, and to the witnesses, sign.

HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write³⁶As explained in the preceding Note, this legalizes the writing of the bill. and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi³⁷He is identical with the Rav Jeremiah mentioned later in this paragraph. Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel³⁸The Babli, 67a, which attributes the statement to Rav, explains that the procedure is disapproved of since a wife might hire witnesses to falsely instruct the scribe to write and witnesses to sign.. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel³⁹A similar question, in the name of Rav’s Academy, is mentioned in the Babli, 66b.: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study⁴⁰The woman is divorced but she cannot remarry based on that bill.. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony⁴¹The argument is cryptic. It assumes that the question was: “If he said to two people, tell X that he write and you sign; they told the scribe to sign and others to sign.” (In the Babli, the question is inverted, with the witnesses being instructed to have others sign but they signed themselves.) The question then arises, is it sufficient that the bill of divorce be written correctly (which it is) but not signed according to instructions? (The arguments of the Babli about this case are irrelevant for the Yerushalmi.).

We understand⁴²This now is a discussion of the Mishnah. The persons asking whether a bill of divorce should be written cannot engage witnesses without special authorization. But why should the scribe not be able to write on a simple order since he is able to write the entire bill of divorce in advance, just leaving blanks for the names and addresses of the parties?, to the witnesses, sign! But to the scribe, write? Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid⁴³The problem of bills written in advance was treated in Chapter 3, Note 17 ff.. He explains it⁴⁴The Mishnah here follows R. Jehudah who prohibits the scribe from using prepared texts. following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulas.

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything⁴⁵Nobody can be divorced after his death. The next sentence makes it clear that a bill of divorce would be valid if given on condition to become activated one hour before the husband’s death. But from that moment he can no longer live with his wife without invalidating the divorce.. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce⁴⁶The husband’s intent cannot be determined from this language. Does he want to say that the divorce shall be valid from the moment the bill was handed to his wife if he should die (either from the illness he is currently suffering from, or on a trip overseas he is just starting, or any other foreseeable dangerous situation which causes him to write the bill), or does he really mean that the divorce should become effective only at the time of his death? In the first case, the wife becomes a divorcee after his death, in the second case she becomes a widow.
In some Bablylonian sources, the wording is “it is and is not a bill of divorce.”; if he dies⁴⁷If he dies childless and has a brother, the wife cannot enter levirate marriage since she might be a divorcee; she cannot marry outside the family without ḥalîṣah since she might be a widow; cf. Introduction to Tractate Yebamot. she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,’ he did not say anything.” ⁴⁸This paragraph is also in Niddah 3, explained there in Notes 93–97. “Rebbi Jehudah the Prince” may be Judah II, Rebbi’s grandson; cf. Note 51. But our teachers said, it is a bill of divorce⁴⁹The Babli, Giṭṭin 72b, reports the same but in 76b refers the decision to Mishnah 7:9: “If he says, this is your bill of divorce if I do not return within 12 months; if he dies in the meantime, the bill of divorce is void.” In this case also, he did not specify from today. The Babli explains that in both cases they follow R. Yose who holds that “the date of a document is proof of its validity;” a bill of divorce executed before the husband’s death is valid (cf. below, Note 67). The Yerushalmi’s interpretation is given in the second and third paragraphs following.. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court⁵⁰Šabbat 1:1 (3d 1.20), Giṭṭin 7:3 (48d 1.17), Avodah zarah 2:8 (41d 1.48); obliquely mentioned in the Babli Giṭṭin 72b, 76b; Ketubot 2b, Avodah zarah37a.. In three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil⁵¹Mishnah Avodah zarah 2:9. The Mishnah has a list of foods that cannot be taken from Gentiles without kosher supervision since one cannot be sure that no forbidden ingredients were used, but which are not forbidden for usufruct. A first group includes milk, bread, and olive oil, with a note that “our teachers permitted olive oil” [to be used without supervision.] In the Babli, this permission is attributed to Rebbi, not his grandson R. Jehudah the Prince. (The chronology of the House of Hillel in the Third Cent. and the attribution of decrees between Rabbis Jehudah I, II, and III is in dispute.), and a sole⁵²If a woman has a miscarriage in the shape of a sole (essentially an empty placenta) she is subject to all disabilities of the woman who gave birth to a male and a female. Rebbi Jehudah’s court restricted this to the case that a human shape was recognizable.. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael⁵³In Niddah simply: R. Yudan. said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce.

May she⁵⁴This cannot refer to the case in the Mishnah here, but must refer to Mishnah 10, about a man going overseas who gave his wife a bill of divorce to be valid if he should not return within 12 months. It is clear that the wife can remary after 12 months. The question is whether she can remarry within 12 months if news was received of her husband’s death (meaning that he would not be able to return) but the news was not brought by two witnesses testifying in court. be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose: she is forbidden to remarry; I say that a miracle happened to him and he survived.

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis⁵⁵Since in the sequel Rebbi (who is “our teachers”) objects to the rabbis, it follows that here one has to read: The rabbis (of the Mishnah) objected to our teachers (who declare the bills of divorce of the first series as valid.): Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”⁵⁶Our teachers follow R. Yose (Note 67) who declares that “the date of a document is proof”, meaning that the date of a document valid under certain conditions is proof of intent that it should be valid from that date on once the condition was satisfied. Therefore, the difference between the first and second series of bills of divorce is irrelevant; all are conditional in the same way.! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce⁵⁷He really did not say “if” but “from today after my death” but this means the same as “from today on condition that I shall have died.” In any case, it is a dated document with an implied condition.! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point⁵⁸An undated document, while valid if executed unconditionally and delivered before witnesses at the time it was written, can never be validated after that time.. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce⁵⁹“From today after my death”.? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement⁶⁰The first two examples of the second series., he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point⁶¹That every dated document containing a condition is to be read as valid from the date of execution once the condition is satisfied (unless it is stated otherwise in the document.). There⁶²In the Babli, 72b, Rebbi is quoted to the effect that “from today after my death” is a valid condition., they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die⁶³Retroactively valid now if the husband dies from his current illness.” or “on condition that it be after my death⁶⁴That the divorce be valid only after the husband’s death.”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.⁶²In the Babli, 72b, Rebbi is quoted to the effect that “from today after my death” is a valid condition.”

There⁶⁵Mishnah Baba Batra 8:7., we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death⁶⁶By a positive biblical rule, an inheritance has to be divided evenly among the male heirs (Num. 27:6–11) except that the firstborn male in rabbinic interpretation receives a double portion (Deut. 21:17). If the father wants to distribute his property unevenly, or leave real estate to his daughters, he has to execute a will which has to become valid during his lifetime since nobody can act in law after his death.. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof⁶⁷Since everybody knows that a will has to be activated during the testator’s lifetime, the date of the will automatically becomes the date of its validation except if this is disclaimed in the document itself. The same statement is in the Babli, Baba Batra 136a.. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition⁶⁸Perhaps compare Greek ὕστερος “later, subsequent” as in combination τῇ ὑστέρῃ προσβολῇ “later, subsequent, conditions added to a document.” (E. G.) Less likely is a relation between the hapax איסרטה and Arabic شرطة “stipulation, clause” which might be Aramaic שטר, Accadic šeṭrum,šaṭārum “document”.. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts⁶⁹This is a reformulation of the colleague’s statement: R. Yose’s statement about wills is applicable neither to divorces nor to gifts.. Rebbi Ila⁷⁰He disagrees with R. Ze‘ira. said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself⁷¹During his lifetime.. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation⁷²If it is a divorce, the wife will be able to marry another man.. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body⁷³The use of prothetic א for אל, על is Babylonian. He wants to prevent his wife from remarrying during his lifetime. Therefore, the mention of “after death” contradicts the statement “from today” and there is no divorce. Rashba (Novellae ad 72b) reads: “the bill of divorce is unclear” (He also reads לְשַׁייֵר לוֹ גוּפָהּ, a better Yerushalmi style). to himself. Rebbi Bibon⁷⁴Rashba reads: R. Bun. [Compare the Latin adjective vivus “alive” as equivalent of חַיִים; cf. also the Roman name Bibulus. (E.G.)] bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself⁷⁵Then the divorce would be absolute and the wife entitled to remarry during her first husband’s lifetime.? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”

The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill⁷⁵Then the divorce would be absolute and the wife entitled to remarry during her first husband’s lifetime.; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill⁷⁶The document is self-contradictory and therefore invalid.. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned⁷⁷And freed from some of the obligations imposed by biblical law on agricultural properties in the Land; cf. Sevi‘it 9:6, Note 85.; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications⁷⁸Donations to the Temple or, in later times, for charitable purposes.? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.”⁷⁹Formulated in the third person this is Mishnah Qiddušin 1:6. Promises of charitable giving always are absolute and irrevocable. Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married⁸⁰This refers to Mishnah Qiddušin3:1: “ ‘(You are preliminarily married to me) after 30 days from today’, if another man married her preliminarily within the thirty days she is married and not married.” In the Babli, Qiddušin 59b, Rav holds that she is permanently disabled from marrying anyone unless she receives a bill of divorce from both men; Samuel holds that she cannot definitively marry until the 30 day period has passed, when the claim of the second man disappears automatically. In contrast, Rebbi here asserts that the preliminary marriage of the second man never was valid in law..

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should die from this illness;” if he got up, walked on the market⁸¹If he got out of bed but never left the house, then fell ill again and died, it is a valid bill of divorce even without an expert opinion on the cause of death., fell ill again and died, one estimates whether he died from the original sickness, in which case it is a bill of divorce; otherwise it is no bill of divorce. She may not be alone with him except in the presence of witnesses⁸²To avoid intimacy. If she has sex with him then either it is married sex and the bill of divorce is automatically invalidated, or it is illicit sex and sinful. In Mishnah 8:4, the House of Hillel invalidate any bill of divorce if husband and wife were alone together at any time between the signing of the document and its date of validation. The House of Shammai do not invalidate the bill. The Mishnah follows the House of Hillel., which may be even a male or a female slave except her personal slave girl since she has no shame in the presence of her personal slave girl. What is her status in those days? Rebbi Jehudah says, she is a married woman in all respects. Rebbi Yose says, she is divorced and not divorced⁸³She is divorced in criminal law but not divorced in civil law..

HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce from today,” etc. If he overate on groats it is as if he died from that illness, hazelnuts⁸⁴Arabic فندق, from Greek κάρυον ποντικόν “Pontic (Black Sea) nut”. alone and he did not get out of bed it is as if he did not die from that illness⁸⁵Overindulging in cereal is not in itself life threatening, but eating hazelnuts without anything else is (since it causes both vomiting and diarrhea at the same time)..

“If he died from that sickness⁸⁷This is the condition on which the bill was delivered.,” and a stone heap fell on him, or a snake bit him⁸⁸While the patient was still bedridden, he died from another cause., it cannot be a bill of divorce unless he died of that sickness. “If I should not recover from that sickness⁸⁷This is the condition on which the bill was delivered.,” and a stone heap fell on him, or a snake bit him⁸⁸While the patient was still bedridden, he died from another cause. it is a bill of divorce since he did not recover from that sickness⁸⁹The Babli agrees, 73a..

It was stated: “Also the one in mortal danger.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it happened in such a case that he died during intercourse⁹⁰A terminally ill person is forbidden intercourse not for legal but for medical reasons..

“Whether he died from the original sickness.” Are male or female slaves trustworthy⁹¹The validity of the bill of divorce may be the subject of a law suit. Can such a suit be decided on the testimony of slaves? Slaves cannot be witnesses in court because (1) their testimony is subject to the influence of their master and, more importantly, (2) in money matters they are not subject to the laws of perjury (since they do not have personal property) and “the testimony of a person not subject to the laws of perjury is worthless.”? The witnesses know that at the time she was alone with him a male or female slave was present⁹²The slaves do not have to appear in court.. ⁹³A parallel text is in Tosephta 5:4 and Babli 73b; the text is partially quoted in Soṭah 1:1, Note 52.“If she was alone with him with the knowledge of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him⁹⁴Since two witnesses establish a fact by biblical rules and the House of Hillel invalidate a bill of divorce if the parties were alone together between signing and time of validation, the knowledge of two independent witnesses in itself invalidates the bill.. One witness, she does not need a second bill of divorce from him⁹⁵A single witness has no standing in court in matters of validity of marriages or divorces.. One in the morning and one in the afternoon, that was a case and Rebbi Eleazar bar Thaddeus⁹⁶The name is תַּדַּאי “Thaddeus” in Soṭah, the two parallel (and additional) Babylonian sources, against the reading “Tradion” here. asked the Sages who said, this is not [testimony of] being alone⁹⁷Two single witnesses testifying about two different facts can never be considered as two witnesses for a pattern; cf. Soṭah 1:1, Note 52.. If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about intercourse but not about preliminary marriage⁹⁸Preliminary marriage (not intended to be definitive) can be effected by intercourse (Mishnah Qiddušin 1:1); this is biblical standard. A marriage ceremony which is not witnessed is automatically invalid but it is possible to consider the witnesses to their being alone together as witnesses of intercourse. In Mishnah 8:11 the House of Hillel require only minimal standards from witnesses once the parties had been definitively married and living together.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage.” Rebbi Jeremiah explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect anything. Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: If she was alone together with him long enough for intercourse, one suspects her about immoral intercourse but not about preliminary marriage by intercourse. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by intercourse. If the time was not long enough for intercourse, one does not suspect preliminary marriage bymoney⁹⁹This is an extraordinary relaxation of the standards of testimony in the circumstances of Mishnah 8:11. The Babli, 73b, rejects any legal consequences of physical intimacy not confirmed by two eye-witnesses.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, one also suspects her about preliminary marriage by money. Rebbi Abin said, It turns out that the House of Shammai¹⁰⁰Mishnaiot 8:4,11. parallels the rabbis and the House of Hillel Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah.

For what¹⁰¹What does R. Jehudah mean when he states that the woman who receives a bill of divorce which becomes valid at an indeterminate point in the future is a married woman in all respects?? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her¹⁰²If the wife dies before her severely ill husband. In the Babli (73b/74a) and the Tosephta (5:4), this is a tannaïtic statement., as we have stated there¹⁰³Mishnah Ketubot 4:6. The reference is to the part of the Mishnah which is not quoted, viz., that the husband has the usufruct from the wife’s properties (and inherits from her should she die during the marriage.): “He has a claim on what she finds and on her earnings, to dissolve her vows.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is what is implied by “she is a married woman in all respects.¹⁰⁴The husband did not relinquish his right to his wife’s properties’ yield.”

The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There¹⁰⁵Mishnah Yoma 1:1. On the Day of Atonement, the High Priest first has to atone for “himself and his house” (Lev. 16:6). “His house” is interpreted to mean “his wife”; an unmarried High Priest is unable to officiate. R. Jehudah requires that the married High Priest preliminarily marry another woman lest his wife die in the week before the Day of Atonement and prevent him from serving. He cannot definitively marry another woman since he alone among all Jews is required to be monogamous (Lev. 21:13). The other rabbis consider R. Jehudah’s precaution to be excessive., he says that death is frequent but here, he says that death is not frequent¹⁰⁶He could not say that the woman who received a bill of divorce “from now if I should die” is married in all respects if at any moment he would expect the husband to die and the wife to be divorced.. There in public, here in private, as it was stated¹⁰⁷תניא is Babylonian spelling for Yerushalmi תני. The reference is to Šeqalim 6:5 (belonging to Mishnah 6:7). The Mishnah enumerates 13 chests which were maintained at the Temple gate for the public to deposit its contributions. One of the chests was labelled for “nests”, the pairs of birds required as a purification sacrifice (Lev. 12:8) before a woman after childbirth could partake of family sacrifices. The women would deposit the money in the chest and every day the priests would offer the corresponding number of pairs of birds to purify the women. R. Jehudah holds that there was no such automatic arrangement in the Temple but that every woman after childbirth had to provide the pair of birds and personally hand them to a Cohen. His problem was that one of the birds was a holocaust but the other a purification offering and purification offerings might be presented only for living persons. If a woman died between the time she deposited the money in the chest and the next morning when the money was counted and the number of birds determined, then not only her purification offering would be invalid (it could not be offered, nor could it be released; it had to be kept in isolation until it died) but it would invalidate all other offerings of the same day (cf. Babli Yoma 55b/56b). R. Jehudah goes to extraordinary lengths for fear of sudden deaths; his position in the Mishnah here becomes more difficult to understand.: Rebbi Jehudah says there was no chest for nests in Jerusalem because of the mixing, maybe one of them would die and money for purification offerings destined to die would be mixed in with them.

What is the status of her intercourse¹⁰⁸What is the legal status of a woman who had intercourse with another man after she had received a bill of divorce valid “from today when I shall die.”? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain¹⁰⁹It certainly is sinful., but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt¹¹⁰If the husband dies, it is clear retroactively that the intercourse was permitted.. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice¹¹¹If the man involved was unaware at the moment of the act that the woman might be married. The “hung” sacrifice is the expiation sacrifice prescribed in Lev. 5:17–19 for an unintentional sin whose nature eludes the perpetrator.. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice¹¹²A regular purification sacrifice (Lev. 4:27–35) for unintentional adultery. No sacrifice can ever atone for intentional sin (Num. 15:30)..

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz;” she is divorced and has to pay¹¹³She is divorced immediately but she cannot act on the divorce (either claim the ketubah or remarry) before she paid up.. “On condition that you give me within thirty days,” if she paid within thirty days she is divorced, otherwise she is not divorced. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, it happened in Sidon that someone said to his wife “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you return to me my stole¹¹⁴Greek στολίς, στολή “garment” also “equipment, arms, etc.” Can the rabbinic Hebrew כֵּלִי “garment” (for biblical “vessel, equipment, arms”) be induced by analogy with the Greek (E. G.)? In Latin stola “garment, ceremonial robe”.” and it turned out that his stole was lost; then the Sages said, she shall pay him its value¹¹⁵Since this statement is labelled as Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel’s, it follows that others either invalidate the divorce if the stole cannot be found or that she has to replace it in kind..

HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz,” etc. It was stated¹¹⁶In the Babylonian sources, Babli 74a (Qiddušin 60b), Tosephta 5:5, this is formulated as a dispute: “If he died before she paid, she is subject to levirate marriage; after she paid, she is not subject to levirate marriage; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said …”: If she did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, she pays his father or his brother and is free from ḥalîṣah and levirate marriage¹¹⁷If the husband died childless, cf. Introduction to Tractate Yebamot. As the Babli explains, 74a, “anybody who says ‘on condition that’ means to say ‘valid immediately on condition that’ ” (Tosephta 5:6). The delay in fulfilling the condition does not change the fact that the divorce preceded the husband’s death.. ¹¹⁸While the statement on divorce is also quoted in Qiddušin 3:2 (63d line 16) as tannaïtic, the parallel about marriage is presented as amoraic inference. It is obvious that at the moment of preliminary marriage the groom has to give some valuables to the bride. The same holds for preliminary marriage: “You are preliminarily married to me on condition that I shall give you 200 zuz;” if he did not manage to pay before he died, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, his father or his brother pay and she is subject to ḥalîṣah or levirate marriage.

Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion¹¹⁹The reason Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel does not insist that the condition on which the divorce was given be fulfilled to the letter is that the wife is an unpaid trustee who is not required to pay for damages beyond his control. In contrast to the unpaid trustee who has to swear that it was beyond his control if he does not want to pay, the wife does not have to swear (Ketubot 9:4, Note 121).. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath¹²⁰If R. Yudan’s explanation were correct, some reference should have been made to the rules of trustees. Since no reference was made, it makes no difference why the stole was lost. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel from the start treats the request for the stole as a request for money.? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce¹²¹The rabbis who oppose Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel require fulfillment of the condition to the letter. If the stole cannot be produced for any cause whatever, the divorce is invalid. In the Babylonian sources (38a, 75a; Baba qama 69a, Baba meṣi‘a 38b, Baba batra174a, Ketubot 77a, Sanhedrin 31b, Bekhorot 24a), practice is decided following the rabbis. This is reported as Babylonian practice in Baba batra10:14 (17d 1. 9)..

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” “on condition that you breast-feed my son,” how long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years¹²²This is R. Meїr’s opinion; cf. Soṭah 4:4, Notes 55 ff. She does not have to nurse the baby for two years after the divorce but only until he reaches the age of two years (Tosephta 5:6). Since the expenses of child-rearing are the father’s responsibility, the mother does not have to nurse her child if she is divorced before the child is weaned.; Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months. If the son or the father died, it is a valid divorce¹²³This may mean that, if the father or the child died immediately after the bill of divorce was handed over, the divorce nevertheless stands. It is a matter of dispute in the Halakhah..
“On condition that you serve my father for two years,” or “on condition that you breast-feed my son for two years;” if the son died or the father said, I cannot stand you serving me (without being offended)¹²⁴She did nothing to offend the father., it is no divorce¹²⁵Since the condition was not satisfied. The Mishnah in the Babli and most Mishnah mss. adds: “or if the father died in the meantime”.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, that is a divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated a principle: Given any hindrance which is not from her side, it is a divorce.

HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” etc. Rebbi Abba¹²⁶The scribe first wrote “R. Ḥiyya bar Abba” and then deleted “R. Ḥiyya”. The editio princeps has “R. Ḥiyya bar Abba”. But since the opposite opinion is referred to as R. Simeon ben Laqish’s, one of R. Ḥiyya bar Abba’s teachers, the final text of the ms. is the correct one, against the editio princeps. said: During his lifetime, on condition that she serve all his needs, on condition that she breast-feed all his needs¹²⁷His interpretation of Mishnah 6 is that the absence of any time limit in the condition implies that the divorcee has to be the husband’s father’s geriatric nurse for the rest of the latter’s life or to breast-feed her child for a full 24 months.. ¹²⁸It seems from the following that a note “Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said,” was omitted here. In the Babylonian sources, Babli 75b, Tosephta 5:6, it is a tannaïtic text. Even if she did not serve all his needs, even if she did not breast-feed all his needs, but even if she served him for one hour, or breast-fed him for one hour¹²⁹He opts for a minimalist interpretation of the condition. Since no time limit was given, any service or any breast-feeding satisfies the condition and validates the divorce.. After death^123,This may mean that, if the father or the child died immediately after the bill of divorce was handed over, the divorce nevertheless stands. It is a matter of dispute in the Halakhah.¹³⁰It could also mean, "after the husband's death." Cf. S. Lieberman's commentary to Tosephta 5:6., even if she never served him or never breast-fed him. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “How long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years, Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months.” Rebbi Abin said, this was taught about the cost of a wet-nurse¹³¹R. Abin reads the condition not as a request that the ex-wife breastfeed her child for 24 months and therefore be forbidden to remarry during all this time (cf. Soṭah 4:4, Notes 55 ff.) but that the wife pay for a wet-nurse to care for the child in the husband’s house, with the wife being free to remarry 90 days after the divorce..

¹³²The text is also in Qiddušin 3:2 (63d 1. 20), readings noted ק. The contract text is also in Erubin 3 (21b 1. 20), noted ע. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text¹³³Greek τὸ σύμφωνον “(written) agreement”. In general, a preliminary marriage was concluded by an act of the male, with passive acceptance by the female. Since a preliminary marriage can also be effected by contract (Mishnah Qiddušin 1:1), in certain circles in Galilee this was the preferred course of action (it is not mentioned in the Babli.) The main attraction of the contractual marriage for the woman was that it provided insurance against foot-dragging by the groom (cf. Mishnah Ketubot 13:5).: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in¹³⁴The translation follows the parallel texts in Qiddušin and Erubin. The text here would read: “but not transfer real estate to you”., I shall have no claim on you¹³⁵The preliminary marriage is conditional. If the condition is not satisfied, the marriage is non-existent and the woman may marry another man without needing a bill of divorce from the first. She may even marry a Cohen, which would be impossible if the first preliminary marriage had been valid..” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive¹³⁶The condition is absolute. If the definitive marriage did not take place before the contracted date, the preliminary marriage is annulled.. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted¹³⁷If the only reason that the definitive marriage did not take place were circumstances beyond the groom’s control, the preliminary marriage is not annulled.. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.¹³⁸The condition has to be formulated not for the male, who actively has to take the woman in and therefore can claim unavoidable circumstances, but for the passive female. Since the contract is σύμφωνον, a mutual agreement, she gives her passive acceptance of the preliminary marriage only on condition that she be definitively married by a fixed date. If she refuses her agreement, no preliminary marriage is possible and no bill of divorce due.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy¹³⁹If a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by the terms of R. Joḥanan’s formulation of the contract and is not married by the time specified because of unavoidable circumstances, and then contracts another marriage without a bill of divorce in the domain of jurisdiction of a court following R. Simeon ben Laqish, her children from the second marriage will be illegitimate if the first groom claims her as his wife..

A person gave money for a ship when the canal dried up¹⁴⁰This is in Babylonia, where most transport is by water. A person rented a ship for some future transport and then could not use it since in the meantime the canal had dried up. This shows that the disappearance of the old system of canals between Euphrates and Tigris cannot all be dated to the Arab conquest but that the neglect of the canal system already started early in Sassanid times.. The case came before Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: There is the ship, bring the canal¹⁴¹Rav Naḥman holds with R. Simeon ben Laqish that circumstances beyond the contracting party’s control do not invalidate the contract.! Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Abba was praying that the canal should dry up and he could recover his money. He said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Abba are of the same opinion as Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel¹⁴²Who holds in the Mishnah that any circumstance beyond the woman’s control does not interfere with her having complied with the terms of the divorce. (Rashba, Novellae ad 75b, prefers to switch the attributions. He reads אשכחת אמר “it turns out that one has to say”, making the sentence an editorial remark, not R. Abba’s statement.). If she cut off, she hindered. If her hand¹⁴³In order to make sense of this statement, it is necessary with Rashba (Novellae ad 75b) and the commentators to read דַּד instead of ׃יָד “If the woman who was divorced under the condition of breast-feeding her child cut off her breast herself, she violated her contract. If her breast was cut off by others, the hindrance is not her fault and the divorce stands.” (?) was cut off, it is not as if she hindered.

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Judea to Galilee, came to Antipatris, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition¹⁴⁴The great trade route of the via maris, connecting Egypt with Damascus, leaves Judea at Antipatris, near today’s Roš Ha‘ayin, to enter Samaria. The Mishnah states that a person wanting to leave a country is considered to have left it already when he has reached the border, even if he did not actually cross the border. The person is considered to have left the country; if he then changed his mind and returned, he returned within 30 days and invalidated the bill of divorce.. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go from Galilee to Judea, came to Kefar Othnay¹⁴⁵Kafr ‘Uthnay near the excavations of Megiddo was the border town at which the via maris, coming from the South, entered Galilee., and returned, it is invalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within thirty days from today;” if he intended to go overseas, came to Acco¹⁴⁶By the principle explained in Note 144, if the person reaches a harbor where he could find a ship taking him overseas, he is considered to have gone overseas. The Mishnah also can be read as requiring the husband actually to have left the Land of Israel since Acco is partially inside and partially outside the Land (Chapter 1, Notes 64, 77)., and returned, it isinvalidated following his condition. “This is your bill of divorce if I should be absent from you for thirty days;” even if he repeatedly came and left, it is a bill of divorce if he never was alone with her¹⁴⁷Since in the opinion of the Yerushalmi “absent from you” means “not having marital relations with you.” In the Babli, 76b, this is the interpretation of Rav Huna, against R. Joḥanan who invalidates the divorce if the wife saw the husband within a 30 day period..

HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what¹⁵⁰What does “return” mean in the Mishnah?? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house¹⁵¹“Return” means that he returns to his wife for marital relations.; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places¹⁵²He already returned if he entered the community of his residence.. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco¹⁵³If we hold that Acco has the status of a foreign country, the part of the Mishnah dealing with Acco is superfluous. The important statement of the Mishnah then is that he has to return to his wife to invalidate the bill of divorce, following R. Eleazar., and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce¹⁵⁴Mishnah 1:2, Note 77.. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce¹⁵⁵Conditions have to be interpreted following common use, not in legal jargon. For everybody, Acco is a border town of the Land.?

He is forbidden to be alone with her immediately, for maybe he shall not visit her for thirty days and then her bill of divorce would be older than her child¹⁵⁶The condition was an indeterminate period of thirty days, not “from today”. If the husband impregnated his wife after delivering the bill of divorce and later absented himself for 30 days, the record will show that the woman was divorced more than 9 months before the birth of her child. While this has no influence on the duties of the father towards his child, it will damage the child’s reputation..

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is no bill of divorce¹⁴⁸After 12 months the woman is a widow, and a widow cannot be divorced.. “This is your bill of divorce from today if I should not return within twelve months,” if he died within the twelve months it is a bill of divorce¹⁴⁹It is a valid bill of divorce the moment it has been ascertained that the husband will not be able to return within 12 months..
“If I should not return within twelve months from today write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it within¹⁵⁷This text is supported by a number of Mishnah mss. but all known Babli mss. read “after 12 months”. In any case the bill is invalid since the instructions of the husband were not followed to the letter. twelve months, it is no bill of divorce. “Write a bill of divorce and deliver to my wife if I should not return within twelve months from today;” if they wrote a bill of divorce within twelve months and delivered it after twelve months, it is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Yose says, this is an example of a bill of divorce¹⁵⁸R. Yose holds that the instructions of the husband were followed exactly since he mentioned “writing” before he mentioned a date. The opposing rabbis hold that the instruction may be interpreted to mean that no bill of divorce should exist before the end of 12 months.. If they wrote after twelve months and delivered after twelve months but he had died, if the bill of divorce preceded the death it is a bill of divorce but if the death preceded the bill of divorce it is no bill of divorce. If it is not known, it is a case where they say, she is divorced and not divorced¹⁵⁹The widow or divorcee can sue the heirs only for sums due to both widow and divorcee..

HALAKHAH: “If I should not return within twelve months from today,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? Because he mentioned writing earlier¹⁵⁸R. Yose holds that the instructions of the husband were followed exactly since he mentioned “writing” before he mentioned a date. The opposing rabbis hold that the instruction may be interpreted to mean that no bill of divorce should exist before the end of 12 months.. But did he not also mention delivering earlier, and you say that it is no bill of divorce¹⁶⁰The question is not answered since it is obvious that the second sentence cannot be read as authorizing delivery before 12 months have elapsed.?

The Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi: “This is your bill of divorce after the holiday.¹⁶¹If the language “after the holiday” (or possibly, after the holiday of Tabernacles”) was used in connection with a bill of divorce; either that the bill should be valid if the husband did not return “after the holiday” or that the bill should be written and delivered “after the holiday”, what is the interpretation of this term?” He said to him, all of 30 days after the holiday are called “after the holiday”¹⁶²The Babli, 77a, accepts this only as Rebbi’s private opinion which is not followed in practice.. Rebbi Bivon bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “This is your bill of divorce on Passover eve”? Even a person who says that all of 30 days after the holiday are called “after the holiday” will agree that 30 days before Passover are not like “after Passover”¹⁶³A reference to “Eve of Passover” means the 14^th of Nisan and nothing else.. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: If somebody said, a qonam¹⁶⁴A formula of “a vow of deprivation”, cf. Introduction to Tractate Nedarim, p. 422. that I shall not taste wine at the end of the Sabbath? He said to him, after the end of the Sabbath he is forbidden, Sabbath eve he is permitted, the days in between are problematic¹⁶⁵The night following the Sabbath is certainly called “after the Sabbath”. The following Friday is certainly not called “after the Sabbath”. The days in between are questionable. In the Babli, 77a, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday are called “after the Sabbath”, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday are called “before the Sabbath”.. And so it is here, after the end of the Sabbath it is a bill of divorce¹⁶⁶This refers to a condition imposed on a bill of divorce, cf. Note 161., Sabbath eve it is no bill of divorce, but the days in between are problematic.