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7:3:1

משנה: זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ אִם מַתִּי זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ אִם מַתִּי מֵחוֹלִי זֶה זֶה גִּיטֵּךְ לְאַחַר מִיתָתִי לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם מַתִּי הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. מֵהַיּוֹם לְאַחַר מִיתָתִי אֵינוֹ גֵט וְאִם מֵת חוֹלֶצֶת וְלֹא מִתְיַבֶּמֶת.

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything45Nobody can be divorced after his death. The next sentence makes it clear that a bill of divorce would be valid if given on condition to become activated one hour before the husband’s death. But from that moment he can no longer live with his wife without invalidating the divorce.. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce46The husband’s intent cannot be determined from this language. Does he want to say that the divorce shall be valid from the moment the bill was handed to his wife if he should die (either from the illness he is currently suffering from, or on a trip overseas he is just starting, or any other foreseeable dangerous situation which causes him to write the bill), or does he really mean that the divorce should become effective only at the time of his death? In the first case, the wife becomes a divorcee after his death, in the second case she becomes a widow.
In some Bablylonian sources, the wording is “it is and is not a bill of divorce.”
; if he dies47If he dies childless and has a brother, the wife cannot enter levirate marriage since she might be a divorcee; she cannot marry outside the family without ḥalîṣah since she might be a widow; cf. Introduction to Tractate Yebamot. she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

MISHNAH: “This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce if I should die from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,” he did not say anything45Nobody can be divorced after his death. The next sentence makes it clear that a bill of divorce would be valid if given on condition to become activated one hour before the husband’s death. But from that moment he can no longer live with his wife without invalidating the divorce.. “From today if I should die, from now if I should die,” that is a bill of divorce. “From today after my death” is no bill of divorce46The husband’s intent cannot be determined from this language. Does he want to say that the divorce shall be valid from the moment the bill was handed to his wife if he should die (either from the illness he is currently suffering from, or on a trip overseas he is just starting, or any other foreseeable dangerous situation which causes him to write the bill), or does he really mean that the divorce should become effective only at the time of his death? In the first case, the wife becomes a divorcee after his death, in the second case she becomes a widow.
In some Bablylonian sources, the wording is “it is and is not a bill of divorce.”
; if he dies47If he dies childless and has a brother, the wife cannot enter levirate marriage since she might be a divorcee; she cannot marry outside the family without ḥalîṣah since she might be a widow; cf. Introduction to Tractate Yebamot. she must receive ḥalîṣah but is barred from levirate marriage.

7:3:2

הלכה: זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ אִם מַתִּי. זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ מֵחוֹלִי זֶה. זֶה גִּיטֵּיךְ לְאַחַר מִיתָתִי. לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. וְרַבּוֹתֵינוּ אָמְרוּ. הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. מָנֵי רַבּוֹתֵינוּ. רִבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא וּבֵית דִּינוֹ. בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה מְקוֹמוֹת נִקְרָא רִבִּי יְהוּדָה הַנָּשִׂיא רַבּוֹתֵינוּ. בְּגִיטִּין בַּשֶּׁמֶן וּבְסַנְדָּל. וְיִקְרְאוּ לוֹ בֵּית דִּין שַׁרְיָא. שֶׁכָּל בֵּית דִּין שֶׁהוּא מַתִּיר שְׁלֹשָׁה דְבָרִים הוּא נִקְרָא בֵּית דִּין שַׁרְיָא. אָמַר רִבִּי יוּדָן בֵּירִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל. בֵּית דִּינוֹ חָלוּק עָלָיו בְּגִיטִּין.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,’ he did not say anything.” 48This paragraph is also in Niddah 3, explained there in Notes 93–97. “Rebbi Jehudah the Prince” may be Judah II, Rebbi’s grandson; cf. Note 51. But our teachers said, it is a bill of divorce49The Babli, Giṭṭin 72b, reports the same but in 76b refers the decision to Mishnah 7:9: “If he says, this is your bill of divorce if I do not return within 12 months; if he dies in the meantime, the bill of divorce is void.” In this case also, he did not specify from today. The Babli explains that in both cases they follow R. Yose who holds that “the date of a document is proof of its validity;” a bill of divorce executed before the husband’s death is valid (cf. below, Note 67). The Yerushalmi’s interpretation is given in the second and third paragraphs following.. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court50Šabbat 1:1 (3d 1.20), Giṭṭin 7:3 (48d 1.17), Avodah zarah 2:8 (41d 1.48); obliquely mentioned in the Babli Giṭṭin 72b, 76b; Ketubot 2b, Avodah zarah37a.. In three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil51Mishnah Avodah zarah 2:9. The Mishnah has a list of foods that cannot be taken from Gentiles without kosher supervision since one cannot be sure that no forbidden ingredients were used, but which are not forbidden for usufruct. A first group includes milk, bread, and olive oil, with a note that “our teachers permitted olive oil” [to be used without supervision.] In the Babli, this permission is attributed to Rebbi, not his grandson R. Jehudah the Prince. (The chronology of the House of Hillel in the Third Cent. and the attribution of decrees between Rabbis Jehudah I, II, and III is in dispute.), and a sole52If a woman has a miscarriage in the shape of a sole (essentially an empty placenta) she is subject to all disabilities of the woman who gave birth to a male and a female. Rebbi Jehudah’s court restricted this to the case that a human shape was recognizable.. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael53In Niddah simply: R. Yudan. said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘This is your bill of divorce if I should die, this is your bill of divorce from this illness, this is your bill of divorce after my death,’ he did not say anything.” 48This paragraph is also in Niddah 3, explained there in Notes 93–97. “Rebbi Jehudah the Prince” may be Judah II, Rebbi’s grandson; cf. Note 51. But our teachers said, it is a bill of divorce49The Babli, Giṭṭin 72b, reports the same but in 76b refers the decision to Mishnah 7:9: “If he says, this is your bill of divorce if I do not return within 12 months; if he dies in the meantime, the bill of divorce is void.” In this case also, he did not specify from today. The Babli explains that in both cases they follow R. Yose who holds that “the date of a document is proof of its validity;” a bill of divorce executed before the husband’s death is valid (cf. below, Note 67). The Yerushalmi’s interpretation is given in the second and third paragraphs following.. Who are “our teachers”? Rebbi Jehudah the Prince and his court50Šabbat 1:1 (3d 1.20), Giṭṭin 7:3 (48d 1.17), Avodah zarah 2:8 (41d 1.48); obliquely mentioned in the Babli Giṭṭin 72b, 76b; Ketubot 2b, Avodah zarah37a.. In three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers”, about bills of divorce, oil51Mishnah Avodah zarah 2:9. The Mishnah has a list of foods that cannot be taken from Gentiles without kosher supervision since one cannot be sure that no forbidden ingredients were used, but which are not forbidden for usufruct. A first group includes milk, bread, and olive oil, with a note that “our teachers permitted olive oil” [to be used without supervision.] In the Babli, this permission is attributed to Rebbi, not his grandson R. Jehudah the Prince. (The chronology of the House of Hillel in the Third Cent. and the attribution of decrees between Rabbis Jehudah I, II, and III is in dispute.), and a sole52If a woman has a miscarriage in the shape of a sole (essentially an empty placenta) she is subject to all disabilities of the woman who gave birth to a male and a female. Rebbi Jehudah’s court restricted this to the case that a human shape was recognizable.. They should have called him “permissive court” since any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael53In Niddah simply: R. Yudan. said, his court disagreed with him about the bills of divorce.

7:3:3

מָהוּ שֶׁתְּהֵא מוּתֶּרֶת לִינָּשֶׂא. רִבִּי חַגַּיי אָמַר. מוּתֶּרֶת לִינָּשֵׂא. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אֲסוּרָה לִינָּשֵׂא. אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. נַעֲשׂוּ לוֹ נִיסִּים וְחָיָה.

May she54This cannot refer to the case in the Mishnah here, but must refer to Mishnah 10, about a man going overseas who gave his wife a bill of divorce to be valid if he should not return within 12 months. It is clear that the wife can remary after 12 months. The question is whether she can remarry within 12 months if news was received of her husband’s death (meaning that he would not be able to return) but the news was not brought by two witnesses testifying in court. be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose: she is forbidden to remarry; I say that a miracle happened to him and he survived.

May she54This cannot refer to the case in the Mishnah here, but must refer to Mishnah 10, about a man going overseas who gave his wife a bill of divorce to be valid if he should not return within 12 months. It is clear that the wife can remary after 12 months. The question is whether she can remarry within 12 months if news was received of her husband’s death (meaning that he would not be able to return) but the news was not brought by two witnesses testifying in court. be allowed to remarry? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, she is allowed to remarry. Rebbi Yose: she is forbidden to remarry; I say that a miracle happened to him and he survived.

7:3:4

מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי. מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם מַתִּי. הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מוֹתִי. אֵינוֹ גֵט. אָמַר רִבִּי יוּדָן. רַבָּנִין וְרַבּוֹתֵינוּ. מְתִיבִין רַבּוֹתֵינוּ לְרַבָּנִין. לָמָּה אַתּוּן אָמְרִין. הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. בְּגִין דְּאָמַר. אִם. וְהָא סִיפָא וְאִם. וְאַתּוּן אָמְרִין. אֵינוֹ גֵט. אֶלָּא בְגִין דְּאָמַר. מֵהַיּוֹם. אוֹף אֲנָן כֵּן אִית לָן מֵהַיּוֹם עִיקָּר. מְתִיב רִבִּי לְרַבָּנִין. לָמָּה אַתּוּן אָמְרִין. אֵינוֹ גֵט. בְּגִין דְּאָמַר. מֵהַיּוֹם. וְהָא רֵישָָׁא מֵהַיּוֹם. וְאַתּוּן אָמְרִין. הֲרֵי זֶה גֵט. אֶלָּא בְּגִין דְּאָמַר. אִם. אוֹף אֲנָא אִית לִי אִם עִיקָּר. תַּמָּן מַחְלִפִין. רִבִּי יָסָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרַב תְּרֵיהוֹן אָמְרִין. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי תַּמָּן דְּהוּא רַבָּנִין דְּהָכָא. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר. מֵהַיּוֹם. כְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר. עַל מְנָת. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְעָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי יָסָא. עַל מְנָת אִם מַתִּי אוֹ עַל מְנָת לְאַחַר מִיתָה. אָמַר לֵיהּ. עַל מְנָת אִם מַתִּי. רִבִּי בָּא בְשֵׁם רַב. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי הָכָא דְּהוּא רַבָּנִין דְּתַּמָּן. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר. מֵהַיּוֹם. כְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר. לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis55Since in the sequel Rebbi (who is “our teachers”) objects to the rabbis, it follows that here one has to read: The rabbis (of the Mishnah) objected to our teachers (who declare the bills of divorce of the first series as valid.): Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”56Our teachers follow R. Yose (Note 67) who declares that “the date of a document is proof”, meaning that the date of a document valid under certain conditions is proof of intent that it should be valid from that date on once the condition was satisfied. Therefore, the difference between the first and second series of bills of divorce is irrelevant; all are conditional in the same way.! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce57He really did not say “if” but “from today after my death” but this means the same as “from today on condition that I shall have died.” In any case, it is a dated document with an implied condition.! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point58An undated document, while valid if executed unconditionally and delivered before witnesses at the time it was written, can never be validated after that time.. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce59“From today after my death”.? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement60The first two examples of the second series., he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point61That every dated document containing a condition is to be read as valid from the date of execution once the condition is satisfied (unless it is stated otherwise in the document.). There62In the Babli, 72b, Rebbi is quoted to the effect that “from today after my death” is a valid condition., they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die63Retroactively valid now if the husband dies from his current illness.” or “on condition that it be after my death64That the divorce be valid only after the husband’s death.”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.62In the Babli, 72b, Rebbi is quoted to the effect that “from today after my death” is a valid condition.”

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis55Since in the sequel Rebbi (who is “our teachers”) objects to the rabbis, it follows that here one has to read: The rabbis (of the Mishnah) objected to our teachers (who declare the bills of divorce of the first series as valid.): Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”56Our teachers follow R. Yose (Note 67) who declares that “the date of a document is proof”, meaning that the date of a document valid under certain conditions is proof of intent that it should be valid from that date on once the condition was satisfied. Therefore, the difference between the first and second series of bills of divorce is irrelevant; all are conditional in the same way.! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce57He really did not say “if” but “from today after my death” but this means the same as “from today on condition that I shall have died.” In any case, it is a dated document with an implied condition.! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point58An undated document, while valid if executed unconditionally and delivered before witnesses at the time it was written, can never be validated after that time.. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce59“From today after my death”.? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement60The first two examples of the second series., he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point61That every dated document containing a condition is to be read as valid from the date of execution once the condition is satisfied (unless it is stated otherwise in the document.). There62In the Babli, 72b, Rebbi is quoted to the effect that “from today after my death” is a valid condition., they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die63Retroactively valid now if the husband dies from his current illness.” or “on condition that it be after my death64That the divorce be valid only after the husband’s death.”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.62In the Babli, 72b, Rebbi is quoted to the effect that “from today after my death” is a valid condition.”

7:3:5

תַּמָּן תַּנִּינָן. הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לְבָנָיו צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב. מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מוֹתוֹ. דִּבְרֵי רִבִּי יְהוּדָה. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר. אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ. מַה טַעֲמָא שֶׁלְּרִבִּי יוֹסֵי. זְמַנּוֹ שֶׁלַּשְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו. חֲבֵרַיָיא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֵינָהּ איסרטה. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֵינָהּ כְּגִיטִּין אֵינָהּ כְּמַתָּנָה. אָמַר רִבִּי אִילָא. בְּמַתָּנָה. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר. מֵהַיּוֹם. מַתָּנָה גְמוּרָה הִיא. לְאֵי זֶה דָבָר כָּתַב בָּהּ. לְאַחַר מִיתָה. לְשַׁיֵיר לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. וּבְגִיטִּין. מִכֵּיוָן שֶׁכָּתַב. מֵהַיּוֹם. בַּגֵּט. כָּרוּת הוּא. לְאֵי זֶה דָבָר כָּתַב בָּהּ. לְאַחַר מִיתָה. לְשַׁיֵיר לוֹ אֲגוּפָה. אָמַר רִבִּי בִּיְבוֹן בַּר כַּהֲנָא קוֹמֵי רִבִּי אִילַי. לְשַׁיֵיר לוֹ מַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ. אָמַר לֵיהּ. לֹא מָצִינוּ אִשָּׁה נְשׂוּאָה לָזֶה וּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ שֶׁלָּזֶה. וַהֲוָה רִבִּי זְעִירָא מְקַלֵּס לֵיהּ וְצָוַוח לֵיהּ. בְּנֵייהָ דְאוֹרָיְתָא.

There65Mishnah Baba Batra 8:7., we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death66By a positive biblical rule, an inheritance has to be divided evenly among the male heirs (Num. 27:6–11) except that the firstborn male in rabbinic interpretation receives a double portion (Deut. 21:17). If the father wants to distribute his property unevenly, or leave real estate to his daughters, he has to execute a will which has to become valid during his lifetime since nobody can act in law after his death.. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof67Since everybody knows that a will has to be activated during the testator’s lifetime, the date of the will automatically becomes the date of its validation except if this is disclaimed in the document itself. The same statement is in the Babli, Baba Batra 136a.. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition68Perhaps compare Greek ὕστερος “later, subsequent” as in combination τῇ ὑστέρῃ προσβολῇ “later, subsequent, conditions added to a document.” (E. G.) Less likely is a relation between the hapax איסרטה and Arabic شرطة “stipulation, clause” which might be Aramaic שטר, Accadic šeṭrum,šaṭārum “document”.. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts69This is a reformulation of the colleague’s statement: R. Yose’s statement about wills is applicable neither to divorces nor to gifts.. Rebbi Ila70He disagrees with R. Ze‘ira. said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself71During his lifetime.. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation72If it is a divorce, the wife will be able to marry another man.. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body73The use of prothetic א for אל, על is Babylonian. He wants to prevent his wife from remarrying during his lifetime. Therefore, the mention of “after death” contradicts the statement “from today” and there is no divorce. Rashba (Novellae ad 72b) reads: “the bill of divorce is unclear” (He also reads לְשַׁייֵר לוֹ גוּפָהּ, a better Yerushalmi style). to himself. Rebbi Bibon74Rashba reads: R. Bun. [Compare the Latin adjective vivus “alive” as equivalent of חַיִים; cf. also the Roman name Bibulus. (E.G.)] bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself75Then the divorce would be absolute and the wife entitled to remarry during her first husband’s lifetime.? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”

There65Mishnah Baba Batra 8:7., we have stated: “If somebody writes his property over to his sons, he has to write: From today and after death66By a positive biblical rule, an inheritance has to be divided evenly among the male heirs (Num. 27:6–11) except that the firstborn male in rabbinic interpretation receives a double portion (Deut. 21:17). If the father wants to distribute his property unevenly, or leave real estate to his daughters, he has to execute a will which has to become valid during his lifetime since nobody can act in law after his death.. Rebbi Yose says, this is unnecessary.” What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? The date of the document is its proof67Since everybody knows that a will has to be activated during the testator’s lifetime, the date of the will automatically becomes the date of its validation except if this is disclaimed in the document itself. The same statement is in the Babli, Baba Batra 136a.. The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This is no condition68Perhaps compare Greek ὕστερος “later, subsequent” as in combination τῇ ὑστέρῃ προσβολῇ “later, subsequent, conditions added to a document.” (E. G.) Less likely is a relation between the hapax איסרטה and Arabic شرطة “stipulation, clause” which might be Aramaic שטר, Accadic šeṭrum,šaṭārum “document”.. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It applies neither to bills of divorce nor to gifts69This is a reformulation of the colleague’s statement: R. Yose’s statement about wills is applicable neither to divorces nor to gifts.. Rebbi Ila70He disagrees with R. Ze‘ira. said, for a gift; since he said “from today”, the gift is irrevocable. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve the yield to himself71During his lifetime.. But in bills of divorce, since he wrote “from today” in the bill, it would be a separation72If it is a divorce, the wife will be able to marry another man.. Why did he write “after death”? To reserve her body73The use of prothetic א for אל, על is Babylonian. He wants to prevent his wife from remarrying during his lifetime. Therefore, the mention of “after death” contradicts the statement “from today” and there is no divorce. Rashba (Novellae ad 72b) reads: “the bill of divorce is unclear” (He also reads לְשַׁייֵר לוֹ גוּפָהּ, a better Yerushalmi style). to himself. Rebbi Bibon74Rashba reads: R. Bun. [Compare the Latin adjective vivus “alive” as equivalent of חַיִים; cf. also the Roman name Bibulus. (E.G.)] bar Cahana said before Rebbi Ilai, not to reserve her earnings for himself75Then the divorce would be absolute and the wife entitled to remarry during her first husband’s lifetime.? He answered, we do not find a woman married to one man and her earnings belonging to another. Rebbi Ze‘ira praised him for this and called him “son of the Torah.”

7:3:6

אַף בְגֵט שִׁיחְרוּר כֵּן. הֲרֵי גֵּט שִׁחְרוּרָךְ מֵעַכְשָׁיו לְאַחַר ל יוֹם. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט. עַל דַּעְתִּין דְּרַבָנִין אֵינוֹ גֵּט. אַף בְּהֶבְקֵר כֵּן. שָׂדִי מוּבְקֶרֶת מֵעַכְשָׁיו לְאַחַר ל יוֹם. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי מוּבְקֶרֶת. עַל דַּעְתִּין דְּרַבָנִין אֵינָהּ מוּבְקֶרֶת. אַף בְּהֶקְדֵּשׁ כֵּן. כָּל עַמָּא מוֹדֵיי. אֲמִירָתִי לַגְּבוֹהַּ כִּמְסִירָתִי לְהֶדְיוֹט. אַף בְּקִידּוּשִׁין כֵּן. אַשְׁכָּח תַּנֵּי. רִבִּי אוֹמֵר. מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת קִידּוּשִׁין גְּמוּרִין.

The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill75Then the divorce would be absolute and the wife entitled to remarry during her first husband’s lifetime.; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill76The document is self-contradictory and therefore invalid.. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned77And freed from some of the obligations imposed by biblical law on agricultural properties in the Land; cf. Sevi‘it 9:6, Note 85.; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications78Donations to the Temple or, in later times, for charitable purposes.? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.”79Formulated in the third person this is Mishnah Qiddušin 1:6. Promises of charitable giving always are absolute and irrevocable. Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married80This refers to Mishnah Qiddušin3:1: “ ‘(You are preliminarily married to me) after 30 days from today’, if another man married her preliminarily within the thirty days she is married and not married.” In the Babli, Qiddušin 59b, Rav holds that she is permanently disabled from marrying anyone unless she receives a bill of divorce from both men; Samuel holds that she cannot definitively marry until the 30 day period has passed, when the claim of the second man disappears automatically. In contrast, Rebbi here asserts that the preliminary marriage of the second man never was valid in law..

The same situation obtains for bills of manumission. “This is your bill of manumission valid after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is a bill75Then the divorce would be absolute and the wife entitled to remarry during her first husband’s lifetime.; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is no bill76The document is self-contradictory and therefore invalid.. The same situation obtains for abandoning. “My field shall be abandoned after 30 days from now.” In Rebbi’s opinion, it is abandoned77And freed from some of the obligations imposed by biblical law on agricultural properties in the Land; cf. Sevi‘it 9:6, Note 85.; in the rabbi’s opinion, it is not abandoned. Is it the same for dedications78Donations to the Temple or, in later times, for charitable purposes.? Everybody agrees that “my speaking to Heaven is equivalent to my delivering to a person.”79Formulated in the third person this is Mishnah Qiddušin 1:6. Promises of charitable giving always are absolute and irrevocable. Is it the same for preliminary marriage? It was found stated: Rebbi says, she is completely preliminarily married80This refers to Mishnah Qiddušin3:1: “ ‘(You are preliminarily married to me) after 30 days from today’, if another man married her preliminarily within the thirty days she is married and not married.” In the Babli, Qiddušin 59b, Rav holds that she is permanently disabled from marrying anyone unless she receives a bill of divorce from both men; Samuel holds that she cannot definitively marry until the 30 day period has passed, when the claim of the second man disappears automatically. In contrast, Rebbi here asserts that the preliminary marriage of the second man never was valid in law..

Texts

  • Hebrew: The Jerusalem Talmud, edition by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015 · License: CC-BY
  • English: The Jerusalem Talmud, translation and commentary by Heinrich W. Guggenheimer. Berlin, De Gruyter, 1999-2015 · License: CC-BY

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