Yerushalmi Ketubot 9:1 ירושלמי כתובות ט׳:א׳

MISHNAH: If somebody writes to his wife¹After the preliminary but before the definitive marriage, when he does not yet have the administration of her properties.: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” he receives their revenues and if she should die, he inherits from her. In this case, why did he write “I shall have nothing to do with your properties”? If she sold or gave away, it is valid. If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues,” he does not receive their revenues during her lifetime but if she should die, he inherits from her. Rebbi Jehudah says, he continues to receive the investment results of her revenues²If the wife invests some or all of the revenue from her holdings, these new holdings are not referred to in the renunciation. They represent new paraphernalia and as such their administration is the husband’s, who receives their yield. unless he writes: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues, without limits³I. e., even the yield of the k-th re-investment of prior yields, k = 1,2, …, is excluded by this contract..” If he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties, nor with their revenues, nor with revenues derived from revenues during your lifetime and after your death,” he does not receive the revenues during her lifetime and does not inherit from her after her death. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if she dies, he should inherit from her since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah⁴Since in rabbinic interpretation (disputed by Sadducees/Karaites) the husband inherits from his wife but the wife not from her husband; cf. Babli Baba batra 111b, Sifry Num. 134. In the opinion of R. Ismael, this cannot be established from the pentateuchal law of inheritance (Num. 27:7–11) but from the books of Josua, 34:33, and 1Chr.2:22. According to R. Aqiba, the husband’s right of inheritance follows by twisting the text of Num. 27:11., and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid⁵As a general principle, this is Mishnaiot Baba meṣiʻa 7:14, Baba batra8:5. Quoted in Peah 6:10 (Note 159), Giṭṭin 9:1 (50a 1.48), Qiddušin 1:2 (59c 1.40), Baba meṣiʻa 7:10 (11c 1.11); Babli 56a/b, 83b, 84a, and 7 other quotes.
As far as money matters go, his opinion is that of a minority of one; cf. Chapter 5, Note 207. He will agree that in matters of revenues, whose assignment to the husband is purely rabbinic usage, there are no restrictions in the freedom to contract..

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife¹After the preliminary but before the definitive marriage, when he does not yet have the administration of her properties.: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in⁶The language quoted in the Mishnah is appropriate if the husband renounces his right to acquire the administration of his wife’s property. This must be done before the definitive marriage. The Babli agrees, also in the name of R. Yannai (83a).. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions⁷Since he did acquire the right of administration by the definitive marriage, a contract executed after this moment would have to contain language of transfer of rights (by gift or sale) to be legally actionable.
In Giṭṭin 8:1 (49b 1. 30 ff.) it is stated that the husband can deliver a bill of divorce to his wife by depositing it on her paraphernalia property only if previously he had validly renounced his rights to the income produced by that property because the right to income is an ownership right.. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field⁸If he tells his wife that he does not want to take care of her properties, this has no legal consequences since he is obligated to work for her. The only way he can remove his obligation is by a formal transfer of his right to her as a gift.
The Babli (83a, 95a; Giṭṭin 77a; Baba batra 43a, 49a; Keritut 24b) notes that even between strangers such a formula would not transfer property rights.,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there⁹Mishnah 10:6.: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field¹⁰The field is mortgaged to both ketubot; if he dies and there is not enough money in his estate to satisfy the claims of both wives, the wives can reclaim the field from the buyer since their lien precedes his title. and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you¹¹She agrees with the sale and promises not to sue the buyer., the second¹²She was no party to the transaction. If her claim to ketubah is not satisfied, she can repossess the field. one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first¹³The second wife by her action does not diminish the claim of the first to the property., and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you¹⁴All the first wife agreed to was not to sue the buyer. This prevents her from going to court but has no influence on her rights vis-à-vis others. It is stated in Mishnah 10:1 that the ketubah of a first wife has precedence over that of a second wife. Therefore, if the second wife recovers the field from the buyer, the first one may sue the second for the unsatisfied part of her own ketubah. Therefore, the first wife did not transfer any property rights by her statement to the buyer..

If he wrote for her and she wrote for him¹⁵She wrote him the same text he wrote her, that “she has nothing to do with his properties.”. Just as he did not lose his rights so she did not lose her rights¹⁶If she becomes a widow or divorcee, she is not prevented from claiming his real estate as payment for her ketubah.. If he wrote to her “from preliminary and definitive marriage”¹⁷“I shall have nothing to do with your properties, from preliminary and definitive marriage.” The question is, why did he mention preliminary marriage which gives him no rights of administration?, that is the disagreement between the Houses of Shammai and Hillel¹⁸In Mishnah 8:1.. In the opinion of the House of Shammai she shall sell¹⁹Since the House of Shammai give the wife the right to sell any inheritance she received while preliminarity married, the mention of the preliminary with the definitive marriage can only mean that the husband invites his wife to dispose of her property after definitive marriage as if it were only after preliminary marriage.; in the opinion of the House of Hillel she should not sell²⁰Mishnaiot 8:1, 9:1 give only legal standing to the wife’s sales after the fact; they do not invite the wife to sell without her husband’s consent. For the House of Hillel, the husband mentions his disinterest in her properties after the preliminary marriage in order to give her the right to dispose of her properties without asking him, against the opinion of the House of Hillel. But this does not imply that after the definitive marriage he does not want to be asked, following Mishnah 9:1..

²¹There are many different interpretations of this paragraph, detailed by R. Jehudah Rosanes in his Commentary מִשְׁנֶה לַמֶּלֶךְ to Maimonides, Hilkhot Iššut 23:1. The following explanation is simply one which seems reasonable to the author. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule²²This question is very elliptic. It is not obvious whether the document was written before or after the definitive marriage and whether the inheritance was foreseeable or not. If the document was written before the definitive marriage and the wife was in line for the inheritance, there is no reason why the husband’s renunciation of his rights would not be valid since that essentially is the case of the Mishnah. In addition, it is the right of any person not to accept an inheritance. Therefore, in view of the answer given, it seems that one speaks of an inheritance which was unexpected, that at the moment of preliminary marriage the wife was not a probable recipient of the inheritance but that later some prospective heirs died which made the wife the next surviving kin. Since such an occurrence is not foreseeable, no contracts can be concluded about them. If the document was executed after the definitive marriage, it would require an additional statement in which the husband cedes his rights to future yield to his wife.? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence²³For example, in talmudic law a farmer cannot write a futures contract on his grain harvest before his seed has sprouted. Similarly, no contract can be written covering unexpected inheritances.? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield²⁴Since the ketubah contract gives the husband the right to the yield of any future properties coming to his wife during their marriage, whether foreseen or not, it follows that he can deprive himself of his right to yield, whether foreseen or not.? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence^25,If the succinct language proposed by R. Jeremiah is invalid, the more explicit language of R. Levi is also invalid. The objection of R. Abun bar Hiyya is irrelevant as far as a separate contract is concerned. But certainly it would be possible for the husband to renounce his right to yield in the ketubah document itself, since what he acquires by the ketubah he can renounce in the ketubah. In that case, his wife's hand in acquiring estates never was his hand and she does not need his renunciation.²⁶In Nazir 2:5 (52b l. 41), the question is asked about a vow to pay for somebody's nazir sacrifices if a person will make a nazir vow in the future, an act over which the maker of the original vow has no control. The original vow is declared void since the text proposed by R. Levi ben Haita is also void.?

If she sold produce connected to the ground²⁷This refers to the statement in the Mishnah that the wife’s sale is valid if the husband had written that he had nothing to do with her properties. Since he retains the right to the revenue, she certainly cannot sell harvested produce which is her husband’s property. May she sell produce still standing?: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]²⁸The sale is invalid.; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground²⁹The sale is valid.. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce³⁰Since the field becomes paraphernalia property, he retains the right to its yield.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so³¹Tosephta 9:2, Babli 83b. “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue³²Since the field bought with the sale price of the produce becomes the wife’s property, the revenue from revenue is revenue from the wife’s paraphernalia given to her by her husband and belongs to the husband. This is the case mentioned by Rav..” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he³³The husband. not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more³⁴Why do we need Rav’s statement in this case?!³⁵The preceding text is quoted in a slightly different form by Rosh (9:1):
רִבִּי זְעִירָא רַב יְהוּדָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הַכּוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ אֵין לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. אָמַר רִבִּי מַתָּנָה. מַתְנִיתָא לֹא אָֽמְרָה כֵן. אֵלּוּ הֵן פֵּירֵי פֵירוֹת. מוֹכֵר פֵּירוֹת וִילָּקַח בָּהֶן קַרְקַע וְהוּא אוֹכֵל פֵּירוֹת. לָאו כְּכוֹתֵב שָׂדֶה מַתָּנָה לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הוּא וְאַתְּ אָמַרְתָּ אֵין לוֹ לֹא פֵירוֹת וְלֹא פֵירֵי פֵירוֹת. רִבִּי אִמִּי בְעָא. אִילּוּ אַחֵר כָּתַב לָהּ יֵשׁ לוֹ אֲכִילַת פֵּירוֹת. הוּא כָתַב לָהּ לֹא כָל־שֶׁכֵּן.
Rebbi Ze'ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no claim to its yield. Rebbi Mattanah said, a baraita does not say so: "What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, real estate should be bought from the proceeds, and he eats its revenue." Is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more?
The baraita refers to the Mishnah, regarding property which the wife inherits during her marriage. Then the question is raised why does the husband eat the yield of property coming from others but not from his own gift. But in this version, the questions of R. Mattanah and R. Immi duplicate one another. The text of Rosh seems to be a contamination of the current and the following paragraphs.
The passive voice, real estate should be bought, is that of our Tosephta text, in contrast to the quotes from both Talmudim in which he buys the real estate. In that version, the investment decision is not the husband’s. He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”³⁶If the husband sold a field to his wife, he cannot claim the yield. The Babli, Baba batra, 51b, also decides that the husband eats the yield of the field sold but not the one given as a gift.. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife³⁷He gives the field to his wife that she should sustain herself from its yield and he would no longer have to care for her; for this purpose it is obvious that he does not want to take the yield..

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield³⁸The statements are trivial since in the Mishnah both the rabbis and R. Jehudah agree that the husband has no right to the yields; their disgreement is whether the yield of any money saved from the revenues reverts to the husband or not.. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield?³⁹The answer should be a trivial “no” since the rabbis assign to the wife even the compound yield which R. Jehudah gives to the husband. Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield⁴⁰It is obvious that he has no right to the yield which he disclaimed. It is claimed here also that he has no investment power over the part of the yield which his wife does not spend on herself; this explains why he has no right to revenues derived from revenues saved.. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so³¹Tosephta 9:2, Babli 83b. “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce⁴¹Since he sells but not she, the Tanna of the baraita holds that the husband has investment power over the yield revenue which he cannot take for himself. (Cf. Note 35, last paragraph.), buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue⁴²According to R. Jehudah, the wife alone has investment powers for the savings part of the yield, but the husband has the right to the investment yield if not disavowed explicitly.. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield⁴³While he has no right to the yield from investments, he has the investment power unless explicitly disclaimed..

Rav⁴⁴This is the correct text from the parallel in Baba batra 8:6 (from a different editorial team). Rav Jeremiah was a contemporary of Rav, Rebbi Jeremiah lived about 100 years later. Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel⁴⁵This also is Rav’s position in the Babli, 83b, but with a reasoning diametrically opposed to that of the Yerushalmi., but not in the matter of words⁴⁶Rosh has a slightly different text:
רִבִּי יִרְמְיָה בְשֵׁם רַב. הֲלָכָה כְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל. שֶׁאִם מֵתָה יְרוֹשְׁתָהּ אֲבָל לֹא לְעִנְייָן דְּבָרָיו שֶׁאָמַר מִפֻּנֵי שֶׁהִתְנָה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה. וְכָל־הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. בִּתְנָאֵי גּוּף. וְהָכָא בִּתְנָאֵי מָמוֹן אָנוּ קַייָמִין. וְלָמָּה אָֽמְרוּ תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. שֶׁבְּסוֹף הוּא זָכָה בָהֶן.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, that if she dies he inherits from her, but not because of his words, "since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody's condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid," in personal matters. But here we deal with money matters! Why did they say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it.. Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel for he said, if she dies he inherits from her, but in matters of words, “since he made a condition contradicting what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid,” in personal matters. But in money matters, one’s stipulations are valid⁴⁷A generally agreed principle in the Yerushalmi, cf. Qiddušin 1:2 (59c 1.43), Baba meṣi‘a 7:10 (11c 1.11); in the Babli accepted with reservations in the name of R. Jehudah, 57a. and that is a money matter! Why did we say that the condition is invalid? Because in the end he acquired it⁴⁸In Baba batra 8:6, the reason is given the practice follows R. Joḥanan ben Baroqa who holds that wills can be written only in favor of people who could be heirs (if a number of closer relatives had died.) Then the law of inheritance is compulsory and falls under the category of personal matters.. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The law should have been that if she⁴⁹The definitively married wife should retain the right of disposal of her paraphernalia property since she retains sole ownership. sold or gave it away it should be valid, for [the buyer] acquired it. Why did they say it is invalid? That a wife should not sell her husband’s property and say, it is mine⁵⁰She could claim that mortmain property was really hers to dispose of..

Rebbi Justinus had a case⁵¹From the parallel in Baba batra8:6. The reading here is יוסטתא which is inconsistent with the second mention of the name. {Both Juste and Justine probably are provincial forms of Justus, Justinus (E.G.).} and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties⁵³He had no right to inherit from his wife.. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties⁵⁴He confirmed him as his wife’s heir, acting as an appeals judge.. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav⁵⁵Declaring that practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel., Rebbi Joḥanan⁵⁶Holding in Baba batra (Note 48) that the basic provisions of the biblical law of inheritance are a matter of persons, not money., and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis⁵⁷The local court whose rulings were overturned..

They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Following the Sages, if she died who inherits from her⁵⁸The Mishnah only states that if the husband had renounced his rights, he could not inherit from his wife living and dead. It does not state who inherits.? Those, her brothers, inherit from her⁵⁹Here family certainly inherit from her but there seems to be no reason why they should not inherit as if she had been unmarried. The version in Baba batra 8:6 is more intelligible: Rebbi Joḥanan said, her father inherits from her [and after his death] her brothers inherit from her..

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them⁶⁰As stated in Mishnah 4:12, the widow has the option not to take the ketubah money but to live in her deceased husband’s house and be supported by his estate. While the ketubah proper is a lien on the real estate, the widow’s (and her daughters’) support is not. This means that the brothers may divide the inheritance while their father’s widow is still living.. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property⁶¹And the widow has no regress on the buyer if the husband’s heirs do not fulfill their duty towards her. The Babli (e. g., Baba batra 107a) strongly disagrees and holds that brothers who divided an inheritance are like buyers from one another but that they are liable in common for the debts of the estate..

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Abbahu: It is written⁶²Num. 36:4. The argument of the tribe of Manasseh is that if Salpaad’s five daughters (representing most of the Cisjordanian tribe) would marry outside the tribe, their territory would be inherited by their husband’s tribes and be lost to Manasseh.: “If the Jubilee will happen for the Children of Israel.” If the institution of the Jubilee exists⁶³I. e., as long as the 12 tribes were living on their ancestral lands., inheritances return; if the institution of the Jubilee does not exist, inheritances do not return⁶⁴From the moment that the tribes of Gad and Reuben were deported by the Assyrians, in all other parts of Canaan the land no longer had to be returned to its original owners by the buyers in the Jubilee year. Cf. Ševi‘it1:1, Note 7.. It is the opposite way, it comes to tell you that even if the institution of the Jubilee exists and inheritances return, inheritance by biblical law does not return⁶⁵While the verse does not directly prove that the wife’s property is inherited by her husband, it certainly implies that it is given to her sons as ancestral lands.!

⁶⁷The first sentences are quoted by Naḥmanides in מלחמות ה׳ (in the Wilna edition of Alfassi, Yebamot 22a). Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died⁶⁸The husband sold of his wife’s paraphernalia property during her lifetime. Since he was not the owner, he could not sell; the sale is void even when he becomes the heir.? He said to him, his sale⁶⁹Naḥmanides writes מכרו; that may have been a correct ms. or it may be his (obvious) correction of the text. In these details, a medieval quote is not a witness to the text. is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died⁷⁰While a son can legally sell his right of inheritance to a speculator (who would take the risk that the son might die before the father and his investment become worthless), the son cannot sell his father’s property before his father’s death; such a sale is void even after the son becomes the heir.. If she sold and then he died⁷¹She sold of her paraphernalia properties, of which she is the owner, and her husband died during her lifetime. She sold irregularly since her husband had the administration of her properties during his lifetime but after her husband’s death the sale is valid.? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died⁷²The father is not required to inconvenience himself to leave his properties for his heirs.. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah⁷³The reference is not to R. Jehudah (bar Illaï) mentioned in the Mishnah but to Rebbi, R. Jehudah ben Rabban Simeon, quoted in the baraita later in this paragraph., this implies that her sale is a sale⁷⁴As explained at length later, the temporary owner is a total owner and may sell at will. The question why she would want to sell is addressed below.. It was stated⁷⁵A similar text in Tosephta Baba batra 8:4 (fragmentary), Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:9 (16c 1.19); Babli Baba batra 136b/137a (cf. R. Rabbinowicz, דקדוקי סופרים בבא בתרא. p. 374, Note ח).: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]⁷⁶This clause appears in all texts mentioned in the preceding Note; it is necessary to introduce the third beneficiary of the will.. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them⁷⁷In the language of the Babli: If the second died while the first is alive, the properties should return to the first’s legal heirs (in Yerushalmi Baba batra: to the testator’s legal heirs)..” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia⁷⁸In the Babli (Baba batra 136b), he is called “Rav Hoshaia in Babylonia”., the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y⁷⁹As the Babli explains in the name of Rav Hoshaia, for him there is a difference between “it should be given to X, then to Y, then to Z” and “you should inherit, after you Y, after him Z.” In the first case, the properties are given in usufruct but have to be preserved. In the second case, the properties are given in possession; the owner receives title. The only claim the successor has is to the real estate which still is in the preceding heir’s hand at his death; Y cannot complain if X sells the properties. This is made clear in the following baraita.. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.^75,A similar text in Tosephta Baba batra 8:4 (fragmentary), Yerushalmi Baba batra 8:9 (16c 1.19); Babli Baba batra 136b/137a (cf. R. Rabbinowicz, דקדוקי סופרים בבא בתרא. p. 374, Note ח).⁸⁰In the Babli, the position of Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel is modified to mean that a sale is a breach of trust but not that it is void. Since a baraita which forces the Babli to its conclusion is not mentioned in the Yerushalmi, one has to assume that in its opinion for Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel there is no difference in the language of the will; in any case in which a succession of heirs is noted only usufruct is transferred and any sale of real estate is void.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will⁸¹In Baba batra, the text reads: “R. Yannai said, Rebbi agrees that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. R. Joḥanan said, not even as a gift between the living.” The statement of R. Mana (I)/R. Yannai simply means that X, the first heir, cannot give the properties away in a will since the will becomes active only after X’s death and at that moment the real estate is already Y’s property (as explained in the Babli, loc. cit.). R. Joḥanan’s statement is explained by R. Eliahu Fulda, that X may sell for his own needs because he is the owner, but he cannot give away since the original will prescribes that after X it must be given to Y.. So said Rebbi Mana⁸²R. Mana II. before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons⁸³Why should the wife have the power to sell the real estate whose proceeds go to her husband? Is it not that she received the properties on condition that after her, they should be given to her husband or children?? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens⁸⁴She may sell for expenses which the husband is not required to cover.. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell⁸⁵X may sell real estate only for his personal needs but the definition of personal need has to be very generous.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there⁸⁶In the Tosephta from Baba batra. The wife may also sell some of her property and buy herself a burial plot (which, if used, becomes forbidden for all usufruct.), he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Rebbi Yose said: Those who write “if she should die childless, her property should return to her father’s family” write a monetary condition which is a valid condition⁸⁷If the wife should die childless, both her mortmain and her paraphernalia properties return to her father’s family. This text (and its ramifications in medieval rabbinic literature) has been studied by M. A. Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine (cf. Chapter 5, Note 226), vol. 1, Chapter VE, pp. 391–418..